ii PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE 229 



Here Bruno suggests two principles for the classifi- 

 cation and systematising of the sciences, to which it 

 would have been well had he himself and his successors 

 faithfully adhered. The one is, that the modes of 

 measurement, i.e. the methods and laws of the sciences, 

 must differ for the different kinds of existence studied: 

 that a biological law, for example, cannot be adopted 

 as an explanation of mental phenomena, nor the atomic 

 theory account for the phenomena of life. On the 

 other hand there are orders of existence, according to 

 the complexity of the subjects involved. If we regard 

 the science which deals with the more concrete subject 

 as " higher," then each higher science (e.g. psychology) 

 must take for granted the principles and results of each 

 lower science (biology, physics, mathematics), each 

 must adopt and retain a unit for itself, which it has not 

 further to analyse. 



In the same way the minima offer a ground for the The 



1 . . . r , . . r "minim 



distinction of the more abstract sciences one from - m t h e 

 another. The term " individual nature " (afoma natura) ^BBO? 

 may, according to Bruno, have one of several uses. It sciences- 

 may be applied either " negatively or privatively, and if 

 negatively, then either accidentally or substantially." 

 His instance of the accidental use is a voice or sound, 

 which expands spherically, is wholly wherever it is, i.e. 

 the full content of the sound is heard, wherever its in- 

 fluence extends, not a part here, a part there, although 

 the intensity may vary in degree. Of the substantial 

 use examples are the spirit, which is wholly in the whole 

 body of man, or that spirit which is in the whole extent of 



t*:he life of the earth, by whose life we live and in which 

 ve have our being, or, above this substantial nature or 

 ndividual soul, that of the universe, and supreme above 

 ill, the mind of minds, God, one spirit completely filling 



