AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 



always be unable to induce his share tenant to 

 farm any more intensively than an owner of land 

 or a tenant with a fixed rent finds it to his interest 

 to farm his land, for the tenant could otherwise 

 do better by paying a cash rent or by taking up 

 new land of nominal value. On the other hand, 

 the share tenants are, in the United States, quite 

 generally under the direct supervision of the 

 owners of the land, who insist that the share 

 tenant should farm as well as the owner would 

 do. It may be true that this ideal is not often 

 perfectly attained, and yet the tendency is for the 

 landlord to so bring his influence to bear upon 

 the share tenant that the social loss due to share 

 tenancy is, perhaps, not very great. Yet this 

 conflict between the interest of the landlord and 

 that of his share tenant is a factor which becomes 

 more and more difficult to adjust as land values 

 rise. 



LITERATURE 



T; N. Carver, The Distribution of Wealth, Chapter II. 

 Wilhelm Roscher, Nationalokonomik des Ackerbaues, Book 

 II, Chapters II and III. 



PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURAL ARITHMETIC 



BASED UPON AND INTENDED TO ILLUSTRATE THE FOREGOING 

 PRINCIPLES 



Suppose that a farmer who employs labor and capital- 

 goods of a given grade in the production of maize should 

 find by experimentation, that, with wages, wear and tear, 

 interest and other elements which must be taken into 



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