DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 



on B grade land (represented by line D f C') , being 

 valued at n in either case. But, while the C grade 

 farmer will pay a rent of 2n for A grade land 

 rather than farm marginal land, the D grade 

 farmer will take marginal land rather than pay 

 more than n for A grade land. With the given 

 hypothesis the differential rent of A grade land 

 will not be less than n (measured by line ED), 

 for the D grade farmer can afford to pay that 

 much for its use; and it will not rise higher than 

 2n (measured by the line EK), for the C grade 

 farmer would then prefer marginal land for which 

 no differential rent is charged. 



With all grades of farmers competing for the 

 use of land, the differential rent of A grade land 

 will be greater than n ; for, at rent of n, all but the 

 marginal farmers will prefer it to inferior land, 

 because the extra product, due to superior qualita- 

 tive efficiency, is greater on the more productive 

 land. To the extent that the better farmers fol- 

 low their highest economic self-interest they will 

 compete for the better land, and the rent of such 

 land will rise, until, one by one, the less efficient 

 farmers find it preferable to take less productive 

 land at a lower rent. The farmers who are quali- 

 tatively most efficient can pay more for the best 

 land than any of his competitors can afford to pay 

 and still receive a larger net profit than he would 

 receive from the less productive land at the rents 

 which the less efficient farmers pay for such land. 

 169 



