1 1 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



CHAPTER IV. 



COMPARISON OF THE MENTAL POWERS OF MAN AND THE 



LOWER ANIMALS. Continued. 



The moral sense Fundamental proposition The qualities of social 

 animals Origin of sociability Struggle between opposed in- 

 stincts Man a social animal The more enduring social instincts 

 conquer other less persistent instincts The social virtues alons re- 

 garded by savages The self-regarding virtues acquired at a 

 later stage of development The importance of the judgment of 

 the members of the same community on conduct Transmission 

 of moral tendencies Summary, . 



I FULLY subscribe to the judgment of those writers* who 

 maintain that of all the differences between man and the 

 lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the 

 most important. This sense, as Mackintosh f remarks, 

 " has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of 

 human action f it is summed up in that short but imperi- 

 ous word ought, so full of high significance. It is the most 

 noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a 

 moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow- 

 creature; or after due deliberation, impelled simply by the 

 deep feeling of right or duty ? to sacrifice it in some great 

 cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims : s( Duty i Wondrous 

 thought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, 

 nor by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law 

 in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always reverence, if 

 not always obedience; before whom all appetites are dumb, 

 however secretly they rebel; whence thy original?" 



* See, for instance, on this subject, Quatrefages, " Unite de 1'Es- 

 pece Humaine," 1861, p. 21, etc. 



f " Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy," 1837, p. 231, etc. 



J ''Metaphysics of Ethics," translated by J. W. Semple, Edin- 

 burgh, 1836, p> i36 



