MORAL SENSE. 129 



activity, she could not prevent the image constantly passing 

 through her mind of her young ones perishing in the bleak 

 north' from cold and hunger. 



At the moment of action man will no doubt be apt to 

 follow the stronger impulse; and ihough this may occa- 

 sionally prompt him to the noblest deeds, it will more com- 

 monly lead him to gratify his own desires at the expense of 

 ether men. But after their gratification, when past and 

 weaker impressions are judged by the ever-enduring social 

 instinct, and by his deep regard for the good opinion of 

 his fellows, retribution will surely come. He will then 

 feel remorse, repentance, regret or shame; this latter feel- 

 ing, however, relates almost exclusively to the judgment of 

 others. He will consequently resolve more or less lirmly 

 to act differently for the future; and this is conscience; for 

 conscience looks backward and serves as a guide for the 

 future. 



The nature and strength of the feelings which we call 

 regret, shame, repentance or remorse, depend apparently 

 not only on the strength of the violated instinct, but partly 

 on the strength of the temptation, and often still more on 

 the judgment of our fellows. How far each man values 

 the appreciation of others depends on the strength of his 

 innate or acquired feeling of sympathy; and on his own 

 capacity for reasoning out the remote consequences of his 

 acts. Another element is most important, although not 

 necessary, the reverence or fear of the gods, or spirits 

 believed in by each man; and this applies especially in 

 cases of remorse. Several critics have objected that 

 though some slight regret or repentance may be explained 

 by the view advocated^in this chapter, it is impossible thus 

 to account for the soul-shaking feeling of remorse. But I 

 can see little force in this objection. My critics do not 

 define what they mean by remorse, and I can find no defi- 

 nition implying more than an overwhelming sense of 

 repentance. Remorse seems to bear the same relation to 

 repsntance as rage does to anger, or agony to pain. It is 

 far from strange that an instinct so strong and so gener- 

 ally admired, as maternal love, should, if disobeyed: lead to 

 the deepest misery, as soon as the impression of the past 

 cause of disobedience is weakened. Even when an action 

 is opposed to no special instinct, merely to know that our 

 friends and equals despise us for it, is enough to cause great 



