136 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



foundation of morality lay in a form of Selfishness; but 

 more recently the " greatest happiness principle" has been 

 brought prominently forward. It is, however, more cor- 

 rect to speak of the latter principle as the standard, and 

 not as the motive of conduct. Nevertheless, all the authors 

 whose works I have consulted, with a few exceptions,* 

 write as if there must be a distinct motive for every action, 

 and that this must be associated with some pleasure or dis- 

 pleasure. But man seems often to act impulsively, that is 

 from instinct or long habit, without any consciousness of 

 pleasure, in the same manner as does probably a bee or ant, 

 when it blindly follows its instincts. Under circumstances 

 of extreme peril, as during afire, when a man endeavors to 

 save a fellow-creature without a moment's hesitation, he 

 can hardly feel pleasure; and still less has he time to reflect 

 on the dissatisfaction which he might subsequently cxperi-. 

 ence if he did not make the attempt. Should he afterward 

 reflect over his own conduct, he would feel that there lies 

 within him an impulsive power widely different from a 

 search after pleasure or happiness; and this seems to be tho 

 deeply planted social instinct. 



In the case of the lower animals it seems much more 

 appropriate to speak of their social instincts as having 

 been developed for the general good rather than for the 

 general happiness of the species. The term, general good, 

 may be defined as the rearing of the greatest number of 

 individuals in full vigor and health, with all their faculties 

 perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected. 



*Mill recognizes (" System of Logic,'' vol. 15, p 422) in the clear- 

 est manner, that actions may be performed through habit without 

 the anticipation of pleasure. Mr. H. Sidgwick also, in his essay on 

 Pleasure and Desire (" The Contemporary Review," April 1872, p. 

 671), remarks: "To sum up, in contravention of the doctrine that 

 our sonscious active impulses are always directed Toward the pro- 

 duction of agreeable sensations in ourselves, I would maintain that 

 we find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulse, di- 

 rected toward something that is not pleasure; that in many cases tho 

 impulse is so far incompatible with the self-regarding that the two 

 do not easily co-exist in the same moment of consciousness." A dim 

 feeling that our impulses do not by any mean-s always arise from any 

 contemporaneous or anticipated pleasure, has. I cannot but think, 

 been one chief cause of the acceptance of the intuitive theory of 

 moraiity. mid of the rejection of the utilitarian or " greatest liappi- 

 QPSH " theory \\ith respect to the latter theory the standard and 

 the ivorive -vf conduct have no doubt, often been confused, but they 

 we reau M 



