THE ORGANIC CONCEPT OF SOCIETY 1 29 



Three of his analyses are of special importance for our discus- 

 sion: that of different kinds of unity, that of different meanings 

 of self, and that of different goals of social endeavor. 



I. Kinds of Unity, — The totality of the world, or any particular 

 object in the world, according to Mackenzie, may be regarded: 

 (i) as a simple unity, in which there is no real difference of parts; 

 or (2) as a mere collection of differences, in which there is no real 

 unity; or as a system in which there is both unity and difference. 

 And if it is thought of as a system, it may be regarded either (3) 

 as a system in which the parts have an absolutely independent 

 existence, though they are subordinated to the whole to which 

 they belong; or (4) as a system in which the parts are deprived of 

 their independence by being transformed and swallowed up in the 

 whole; or, finally, as a system in which the parts have a certain 

 relative independence, but an independence which is conditioned 

 throughout by its relation to the system, — an independence, in 

 short, which is not freedom /r(?w the system, but freedom in and 

 through it} 



Mackenzie goes on to show that the first might be typified by a 

 single crystal, the second by a heap of stones or bed of flowers, the 

 third by the solar system, the fourth by any chemical combina- 

 tion and the fifth by the life of a single plant. 



Our author shows how these five different views of unity are 

 reflected in different philosophical systems, in various ways of 

 interpreting human freedom, in theology, in one's conception of 

 justice and finally in endeavors to understand society .^ He 

 defines an organism as " a whole whose parts are intrinsically 

 related to it, which develops from within and has reference to an 

 end which is involved in its own nature," ^ and shows that society 

 corresponds to this kind of unity rather than to any of the other 

 four mentioned. 



Its parts are intrinsically related to it, for the rational nature of the beings 

 who compose it is entirely dependent for its being and continuance on the 

 existence of certain social relations. It develops from within ; for its growth 

 consists simply in the unfolding of the rational nature of each of its individual 

 members, — that rational nature being, moreover, always essentially relative 



* Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 129. 



2 Ihid., pp. 131 f. 3 Ibid., p. 148. 



