THE ORGANIC CONCEPT OF SOCIETY 



147 



analysis of social mind by M. M. Davis.^ 

 follows: — 



His outline is as 



Social Mind 



Static 

 Aspect 



Dynamic 

 Aspect 



Objective 



Subjective 



The sum of common mental con- 

 tent (ideas and sentiments) of the 

 members of a society. 

 The common mental qualities and 

 characteristics of such members. 

 Common mental content, com- 

 mon mental qualities and charac- 

 teristics, which are realized by 

 these members to be common. 

 Common mental content and 

 qualities so realized, and function- 

 ing therefore as dynamic social 

 agents up)on the individuals dur- 

 ing childhood and maturity. 



Davis seems to feel that by social mind we should mean 3 

 and 4, both subjective aspects, the former static whereas the 

 latter is dynamic. 



In its essence and practical important bearings, the social mind is to be 

 viewed subjectively. Common beliefs, sentiments, and determinations, 

 exist only in individual minds. They influence individual thoughts and acts. 

 They are essentially independent of any individual in the sense that they 

 would continue to be influential if any one man containing them was removed 

 from society. But we call these common beliefs, etc., a social mind, not 

 merely because they are held in common but because of something more. 

 They become social and make of society a psychic unity, because of the way 

 in which individuals regard them. They are realized to be common. Be- 

 liefs or tendencies, once thought of as common, acquire a new relation to the 

 individual because of this realization. They become d3aiamic agents, 

 influencing action directly and powerfully. 



This is EUwood's position: " Society as a group of individuals 

 carrying on a common Hfe process, thinks, feels and wills only 

 through its individual members. Society . . . must be thought 

 of as a complex unity made up of many individual psychic imits 

 that are in interaction, continually affecting and modifying each 

 other, so that the only imity which we have in society is a unity of 

 process." ^ 



Worms certainly made a good point when he held that social 

 consciousness was like the personal ego because the essential 

 characteristic of being is doing. " Was wirkt, wie das sodale 



* Columbia University Studies^ xxxiii, p. 68. ' Op. ciL, p. 330. 



