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being perceived by the soul, become sensations, through 

 the intimate union of the soul with the body. Hut give 

 me leave to take notice that this union of an incorporeal 

 with a corporeal substance, is a thing so ('itricult to com- 

 prehend, that the profoundest secrets of theology, not to 

 say the incarnation itself, are not more abstruse than 

 this. For how can we conceive that a substance purely 

 immaterial, should be united without any medium (and 

 in this case there can be none) with a body that cannot 

 possibly lay hold on it, and which it can pervade, and 

 fly away from at plea -lire? And it is almost as difficult 

 to conceive, how any part of the body, without except, 

 ing the animal spirits of the brain (for these are as truly 

 corporeal as the other parts) can make impression on 

 substance perfectly incorporeal, and which is not affected 

 by the motions of any parts but the nerve. Nor is it a 

 small difficulty to conceive how a finite spirit, can either 

 move, or (which is much the same thing) regulate anc 

 determine die motion of the body. 



" And suppose the soul in the brain does perceive the 

 different motions communicated to the senses, yet this* 

 though it may give some account of sensation in general, 

 does not give us any satisfactory reasons of particular 

 sensations. For if I demand, for instance, when I look 

 on a bell that is ringing, such a motion, in the brain pro- 

 duces in the mind the perception of seeing and not hear- 

 ing, and another motion coming from the same bell al 

 the same time, produces in the mind, the perception of 

 hearing, aud not seeing : what can be answered, but that 

 such is the good pleasure of the Author of Nature? 

 And if we ask about the differing objects of any orte 

 sense, as, why the light reflected from snow, produces a 

 sensation of whiteness rather than redness ? Why cas- 

 tor produces a stink, and not a perfume ? Why sweet 

 things generally please, and bitter disgust us? Nay, 

 whv a little of some objects (suppose fire) will give plea- 

 sure, a little more of them give pain? To these and a 

 thousand other questions of the same kind, it can only 

 be answered, such is the nature of man. So plain is it, 

 that we are yet to seek both for the definition of a 



