44 



however, more certain, than that the pain which 

 we feel in our foot, is nothing but what the mind 

 perceives as there; in the same manner as the light 

 we see as it were in the sun, is an idea raised by it 

 in our minds. In the same manner we say, we per- 

 ceive colours, or discern odours in objects, when these 

 sensations arise in us from something or other in 

 those objects. Such are the misconceptions of our 

 infant state, from which we can hardly rescue our- 

 selves even in advanced life. 



3. Mallebrandie seized this idea of Descartes, and 

 more fully opened it. In his celebrated work the Re. 

 search into Truth he begins with discovering that the 

 source of our errors is in the abuse of our liberty, 

 and the precipitation with which we form judgments, 

 insomuch that our Densest could not impose on us, were 

 it not for our rashness. For example, when we see 

 light, it is certain we do so; when we feel heat, 

 there is no mistake in imagining we do ; but we de- 

 ceive ouraelves when we fancy that the heat and 

 odours we perceive are external to the mind that feels 

 them. He then combats the errors arising from our 

 way of judging, and having stripped the body of its 

 sensible qualities, instructs us how mind and body 

 co-operate to produce our sensations, and how we 

 accompany them with false judgments. He blames 

 those who always judge of objects by the sensations 

 they excite ; and by an appeal to thurown feelings, 

 for the feelings of all men being different, though 

 the things themselves continue the same, they must 

 judge variously as they are afkcted, but ought not 

 to ascribe tiie diversity of aticctions to the objects 

 themselves. 



4. Were we to bring into review all the ancients 

 liave taught on this subject, we should be surprized 

 at the clearness with which they have explained them- 

 selves, and at a loss to account how opinions tame 

 to be taken for new^ which iiad been already iflus. 



