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remain unchangeable. And as our compound 

 notions are made out of these, so are they all ulti- 

 mately resolvable into them. 



Ideas of sensation are by this property distin- 

 guished : 



1. From such ideas, as are supposed to be innate* 

 and antecedent to the impression of any outward 

 object. 



That we have no such ideas, sufficiently appears 

 even from hence; that we have HO occasion for 

 them. *We have no occasion for innate ideas of 

 sensible objects, because there is an obvious way of 

 obtaining them by the senses. And as to our know- 

 ledge of spiritual things, as it cannot be accounted 

 for by innate ideas, so it easily may be accounted 

 for without them. The rise and whole extent of 

 this knowledge is easily accounted for, from the ideas 

 we have of sensible objects, the necessary conse* 

 quence we draw from their existence, to the exist- 

 ence of things not sensible, and from that manner of 

 conceiving these, which we naturally fall into, by the 

 help and mediation of such things, as are within our 

 present sphere. 



2. From such ideas as are supposed to be acquired 

 by, and seated in the understanding, to be the ground- 

 work of our knowledge of spiritual things, as others 

 are of our knowledge of things material. Now, if 

 there were any such ideas, we must acquire them 

 one of these ways : either, 



First, by the presence of the object itself, and its 



