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are direct and immediate. These original, simple 

 ideas necessarily presuppose the presence of the ob- 

 ject, and its actual impression on the sense ; whence 

 follows a direct and immediate representation of it, 

 without the intervention of any thing else. Thus we 

 could not have had the idea of a tree, if the eye had 

 not actually seen it ; nor of a trumpet's sound, If 

 some of the undulating air had not actually struck 

 upon the ear. 



By this property, ideas of sensation are distinguished: 



1 . From the ideas we have of those objects of the 

 same kind, which we never actually perceived. Thus 

 the idea of a man we have seen, is put for a man we 

 never saw : having no way of conceiving a man that 

 was never present, but by substituting for him the 

 idea of one that was. 



2. From all conceptions of things, which are purely 

 metaphorical. There are two sorts of metaphor, 

 bumau and divine. 



Divine metaphor is the substituting our kleas of 

 sensation, which are direct and immediate with the 

 words belonging to them, for the things of heaven, 

 of which we have no direct idea, or immediate con- 

 ception ; as when God's knowledge is expressed 

 by his leing in every place, his power, by a strong 

 hand. 



Divine and human metaphor agree in this, that 

 the words figuratively transferred from one thing to 

 another, do not agree with the things to which they 

 are transferred, ia any part of their literal sense. So- 



