165 , 



der the particular operations ef the intellect, which 

 presuppose sensation, and contain the whole process 

 and utmost extent of human understanding. 



The first of these is a simple view or survey of the 

 ideas of sensation, just as they lie in the memory. 

 This the logicians have rightly termed simple appre- 

 hension ; but they generally confound it with pure 

 sensation, whereas it is easy to observe these essen- 

 tial differences between them. 1. In simple appre- 

 hension the mind is often active, in sensation always 

 passive : 2 Simple apprehension presupposes sensa. 

 tion, and is always subsequent to it : 3. By sensa 

 tion the mind receives ideas ; by simple apprehen^ 

 sion she surveys those already received. 



The second operation of the intellect on the ideas 

 of sensation is judgment. This may be divided into 

 several species ; the most considerable of which are 

 these that follow. 



1 . The separating our ideas from each other, and 

 ranging them under distinct heads. 



2. The comparing them with each other, and ob- 

 serving their agreements or disagreements. 



3. The enlarging or diminishing them. So we 

 can enlarge the idea we have of a tree, to any size, 

 even to reach the clouds ; or diminish it in our 

 thoughts, till we reduce it to what it was in its first 

 principle or seed. 



4. The dividing or compounding them. So we 

 divide any simple idea into its several parts, or com- 

 pound the ideas of several houses, to make up that 



