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SECT. II. 



Of the different Kinds of Knowledge and 

 Evidence. 



JLT being a matter of the utmost Consequence to 

 the right procedure of the intellect, to state the se- 

 veral kinds of knowledge, as well as the degrees of 

 it in each kind, which can admit of any, I shall ob- 

 serve, that there are three kinds of knowledge, and 

 as many kinds of evidence, on which they are built. 



The first is that we have from our senses, which 

 consists, in aa intellectual view, of the ideas trans- 

 mitted through them to the memory* This is a 

 knowledge direct, immediate, and intuitive, and car- 

 ries in it the highest certainty. Consequently, it 

 admits of no proof from reason : for all sucii proof 

 has less of perspicuity and certainty, than that 

 which it already contains in its own nature. This is 

 a know ledge which admits of no degrees of evidence : 

 for all sensation is in itselt equally certain, and the 

 evidence of all the senses is equally clear, with re- 

 spect to their proper objects. When the sensation is 

 regular and perfect, the assent of the intellect neces- 

 sarily follows all at once; though in a manner quite 

 different from demonstration, which extorts it by in- 

 termediate proof. Not that it yields to the clearest 

 demonstration, when the organ is rightly disposed, 



VOL, v, I 



