174 



4. This sort of know- 

 ledge admits of no de- 

 grees of certainty, and 

 there can be no proof of 

 it, but of one kind. 



5. One demonstrative 

 argument makes the ut- 

 most mathematical cer- 

 tainty, which excludes all 

 possibility of falsehood. 



6. This takes place in 

 things natural and mate- 

 rial, such as quantity, 

 figure, and extension ; 

 ideas of which we have 

 from direct and imme- 

 diate sensation. 



7. Our reasonings on 

 this side are about sim- 

 ple ideas, concerning 

 which there is general 

 consent. 



4. This sort of know* 

 ledge admits of many 

 degrees of certainty, and 

 draws its proofs from all 

 kinds of knowledge. 



5. Many arguments 

 concur to make the ut- 

 most moral certainty, - 

 which excludes all pro- 

 bability, though not pos- 

 sibility, of falsehood. 



6. This takes place in 

 things supernatural and 

 spiritual, such as God 

 and his attributes ; of 

 which we have no idea 

 from direct and immedi- 

 ate sensation, but only 

 from analogy. 



7- Our reasonings on 

 this side are about com- 

 plex notions and concep- 

 tions, concerning which 

 men extremely disagree. 



From the very different, and even opposite nature 

 of moral certainty^ and that which is strictly mathe- 

 matical, it must appear, 



1. That there is as little room for the latter in 

 natural religion, as in revealed, To shew this clearly, 



