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Of probability in general it may be observed, 



1. That, while we are weighing a probable propo- 

 sition, theie are two latent causes of deceit; the one 

 in the intellect itself, which holds the balance ; for if 

 a man is ignorant or weak, so as not to discern the 

 proper reasons, he may be imposed upon by false 

 weights : the other in the will, when, instead of plain 

 reason, a man throws his pride, or passion, or preju- 

 dice, into the scales. And these will, by the invisible 

 turn *)f a false balance, outweigh the strongest argu- 

 ments. 



2. That the higher degrees of probability, in mat- 

 ters of religion, demand our assent: so they do in 

 ail other things. Where the difference is not great, 

 between the opposite sides of a question, men ever 

 close with the greatest appearance of truth, and that 

 iu all things of the greatest moment. Nay, the main 

 conduct of human life is governed by the highest 

 probability ; so that, in many instances, it would be 

 downright madness aot to be determined by it* 

 Yet, 



3. Mere probability is not a sufficient ground 

 for religious faith : this must be built on certain 

 knowledge, which opinion, properly speaking, is 

 not. Indeed, the word is vulgarly taken for any 

 assent, whether formed on probability, or moral 

 certainty : and so it is commonly sakl, " a man is of 

 such an opinion," with regard to the very fundamen- 

 tals of Christianity. But this loose way of speaking 

 ought never to be used, seeing it has a tendency to 



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