68 INSTINCT AND REASON. 



of these faculties was thought to resemble reason about 

 as much as a jack-in-the-box resembles a man. The 

 faculty came into exercise in one invariable way without 

 any choice on its owner's part, just as the jack starts up, 

 whether he will or no, when his lid is taken off. We 

 wondered at the admirable contrivance and design by 

 which these very limited faculties were adapted in each 

 case to the wants and preservation of the species to 

 which they belonged. At times, it is true, with some 

 inconsistency, we permitted ourselves to upbraid the 

 goose with its stupidity ; to speak of the sheep as silly, 

 and the ostrich as wanting intelligence; we even ex- 

 punged the dodo, with its self-preserving instinct, from 

 the face of the earth ; but in spite of these slips and 

 mischances, we still kept gaping and wondering at our 

 own explanation of things, and calling it an excessively 

 wise and ingenious contrivance that every species of 

 animal should have a separate faculty to itself, when one 

 and the same faculty for them all would not only do just 

 as well, but a great deal better. We were far from 

 perceiving how strong a support to Materialism our 

 theory involved, since if the lower animals without 

 reason produce effects like those of reason, then effects 

 like those of reason in a number of cases beyond cal- 

 culation must be the result of bodily structure. It 

 might not follow that the effects of reason itself were 

 the results of bodily structure, but it would become 

 startlingly probable. 



The history of domesticated animals is a continuous 

 proof that some at least of the lower creatures are 



