TWO THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 43 



terms, applying gjS0 to the mental conception and 

 /8g'a to the substantial form. This verbal dis- 

 tinction was accepted by many scholars of the 

 epoch of Liddell and Scott and Davies and Vaughan. 

 A reference to this distinction in the present writer's 

 essay on The Dynamic Foundation of Knowledge 

 provoked at the instance of one critic the allegation 

 that it is not borne out by a critical study of the 

 Platonic texts. That is a matter of little moment 

 and one upon which the writer cannot claim to 

 pronounce. The important point is that in one way 

 or another Plato undoubtedly distinguished be- 

 tween and indeed contrasted the idea and the 

 substantial form. No trace of the solipsism which 

 results from their being confounded and which 

 has ultimately brought to destruction the imposing 

 edifice of Hegelian Thought is to be found in his 

 writings. 



The Platonic doctrine of ideas speedily found an 

 energetic critic in Aristotle. In Aristotle's view 

 it was quite unnecessary and unwarrantable to 

 postulate the existence in the Mind of ideal forms 

 or counterparts of the substantial forms of Reality. 

 This, according to him, was a wholly unnecessary 

 reduplication. He was content to believe that 

 the mind found and recognised the essential forms 



