52 TWO THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 



Of course in such a state of affairs all Knowledge 

 would be impossible. The scepticism which logically 

 followed from such a doctrine was too universal to 

 be capable even of the fiction that it was credible. 

 Berkeley, it is true, endeavoured to save the situa- 

 tion by postulating the incessant and immediate 

 intervention of the Deity as the sustainer of the 

 sensible panorama. This purely arbitrary and 

 fictitious expedient was entirely rejected by Hume, 

 who with fearless honesty carried to its ultimate 

 results the direct consequences of the doctrine and 

 then complacently left human Knov/ledge to take 

 care of itself. 



A masterly protest against the position of Hume 

 was made by his countryman Reid, who in his 

 Inquiry into the Human Mind very clearly pointed 

 out the fundamental difference between the sensible 

 accompaniments or constituents of our Experience 

 and the real and independently existent substratum 

 by which that Experience is sustained and organised. 

 His argument, though it attracted considerable atten- 

 tion, did not, however, affect as deeply as might have 

 been expected the future of philosophic specula- 

 tion, probably because he offered no new clue or 

 key whereby to detect the origin and account for 

 the presence in our Experience of those enduring and 



