62 TWO THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 



proceed at once to a rational explanation of 

 Sensation. 



Sensation is obstructed action. A detailed con- 

 sideration of as many as you like to take of the 

 myriad constituents of our sensible Experience will 

 continually and without exception confirm this 

 simple fact. 



In Nature it is the potent action which is real. 

 It alone can be directly represented by the activity 

 of Thought. The mere obstruction of activity is not 

 a real thing, hence the unreal character of Sensation. 

 Yet the obstruction being an obstruction of the 

 real action of Nature is, if not real, at least 

 actual and immediate. Nay, its presence in our 

 Experience, however mutable and unstable it 

 may be, is the only sure test and guarantee of 

 Reality. 



Each of the two leading theories which have 

 dominated speculation presents one partial aspect 

 of the truth. 



The eternal cognisable element of Reality is 

 apprehended, as the Platonist holds, by the in- 

 tellect and by the intellect alone. To that extent 

 the Platonist is right. That cognisable element is 

 Action. But Action is denoted for us only in the 

 obstructions which it encounters. These obstruc- 

 tions constitute our World of Sensible Experience, 



