TWO THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 71 



the Copernican theory of astronomy, and we know 

 v that that theory offered to and rejected by mankind 

 before the beginning of the Christian era had to 

 wait through sixteen or seventeen hundred years 

 before it secured an acceptance, at first grudging and 

 even now not always adequate. 



The ordinary metaphysical student has hitherto 

 rather resented the idea that in order to a true 

 solution of the problem of Knowledge he must 

 acquaint himself with the fundamental conceptions 

 of physics. Yet so it is. It may perhaps be hoped 

 that when the first strangeness of the new position 

 has disappeared the conditions may be accepted 

 with greater readiness. At any rate, a correct 

 apprehension of our fundamental conceptions of 

 the world of our external experience is indispensable. 

 No theory can wholly dispense with such concep- 

 tions. It is therefore essential that, however 

 elementary, they should be clear and not con- 

 tradictory. Philosophy has always vaguely realised 

 and exacted as much. The need is now imperative. 



Some years ago, in an essay on Schopenhauer, the 

 author, Mr. Saunders, remarked, " How the matter 

 of which my arm is composed and that state of 

 consciousness which I call my Will [imagine anyone 

 calling Will a state of consciousness !] are con- 



