TWO THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 79 



gony still clings to our conceptions, how largely it 

 still dominates or till recently did dominate the 

 religious cosmography of the most civilised peoples. 



In Philosophy our leading teachers seem as yet to 

 have a very feeble appreciation of the new condi- 

 tions. They turn greedily to the eloquent pages 

 of U Evolution crtatrice, but however earnestly they 

 search they cannot find there any definite solution 

 of the difficulties of the age-old problem. They 

 wander wearily through the mazes of psychological 

 detail or wage almost childish logomachies over the 

 interpretation of each other's essays. Philosophical 

 magazines are filled with articles which reflect this 

 state of the philosophic mind. Philosophical con- 

 gresses meet and argue and go home ; Gifford 

 lecturers prelect ; yet so far as can be seen there is 

 little sign that the key has been grasped. The great 

 fact remains obscured amidst a mass of words. 



The elucidation of the problem of Knowledge 

 demands certain improvements in our philosophic 

 terminology. Language as a rule is a very unerring 

 philosopher, and words shaped and polished by long 

 usage generally express, more truly than those who 

 use them realise, the essential reality of things. 

 Yet these long-enduring errors of the ages which we 

 have been discussing here have left their impress 

 too on the terminology of Metaphysics. 



