THE ORIGIN OF MORALITY 47 



co-adaptations and of correlated faculties, but also to a powerful 

 nexus of sympathy and of bio-economic and bio-moral union, 

 binding together the strenuous world of life. 



I strongly insist that morality, at least in the sense of Bio- 

 morality, has as much to do with Biology as morality has to do, 

 on Ruskin's showing, with Political Economy. And I consider 

 that for very important reasons, subsequently to be adduced, a 

 clear conception of the principal data of Bio-morality is of even 

 greater importance than a right answer to the question whether 

 acquired characters are or are not inherited, which answer, 

 according to Spencer, underlies right beliefs, not only in Biology 

 and Psychology, but also in Education, Ethics and Politics. 

 Here as there Spencer's words apply : "A grave responsibility," 

 he says, " rests on biologists in respect of the general question, 

 since wrong answers lead, among other effects, to wrong beliefs, 

 about social affairs, and to disastrous social actions." 



But you cannot deal adequately even with " acquisitions " 

 without making due allowance for the concomitant economic 

 and moral, or bio-economic and bio-moral factors ; and I believe 

 it can be fully shown that the history of " acquisitions " shows 

 throughout the dependence of progress upon the moral signs 

 attached to them, i.e., whether they represent, a plus or a minus 

 of " life " as a result. 



Spencer was alive to the great need of ethical principles 

 scientifically derived. He specially admonished us in the 

 Preface to the Ethics, that the establishment of rules of 

 conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. For, " now that 

 moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed 

 sacred origin, the secularisation of morals is becoming imperative." 



Yet, on his own admission, he did not succeed in establishing 

 Evolutionary Ethics as consistently and sufficiently as one could 

 have wished. This I attribute to the lack of knowledge of Bio- 

 Economics. In the absence of this essential chapter of general 

 Biology, we find Spencer having recourse to relative (i.e., empirical) 

 and " absolute " Ethics and even constrained to admit that the 

 doctrine of Evolution had not furnished guidance to the extent 

 he had hoped. Yet, though the doctrine of Evolution, as then 

 formulated, could not help him in " special ways," he thought 

 that it could help at least in general ways by " bringing into view 

 those general truths by which our empirical judgments should 

 be guided." 



