HERBERT SPENCER'S SYNTHETIC 

 PHILOSOPHY.* 



BY B. P. UNDERWOOD. 



THE movement imparted to philosophy by the applica- 

 tion of the " Newtonian method " to philosophical problems 

 gave rise to that form of sensationalism which originated 

 with Locke and culminated with Hume. Its motto was : 

 Nihil est in intellects, quod non fuerit in sensu. 



Before this movement was started philosophical tenets 

 were principally deduced from "innate ideas." Descartes 

 had appealed to the innate idea of God as ens realissimum, 

 as supreme truth, with which all philosophy had to con- 

 form ; and to Leibnitz innate ideas afforded the main prem- 

 ises for philosophical deductions. But, of course, if there 

 is nothing in mind but what enters into it through the 

 senses, there can not be any innate ideas, such, for instance, 

 as an innate idea of " God " or of " immortal soul." All 

 knowledge must, then, be derived from sensorial experience. 



The negative or destructive phase of the sensation phi- 

 losophy resulted consistently in the annihilation of all ideas 

 not sense-derived. Its positive or constructive phase con- 

 sisted in the attempt to build up knowledge out of sensorial 

 data alone. 



Berkeley dissipated the idea of the " extended substance," 

 or matter as externally subsisting, by showing that the sen- 

 sorial elements entering into the idea of matter its primary 

 qualities, such as extension, form, etc., as well as its second- 

 ary qualities, such as hardness, color, etc. that all these 

 elements, without exception, are subjective, mere modes of 

 feeling; that the belief that there exists an extended, 

 formed, hard, and colored substance outside the perceiving 

 mind is an illusion. Berkeley made use of this way of rea- 

 soning to combat materialism, and to glorify the idea of 

 God and of the immortality of man. With him it was God 

 who awakened the sensorial perceptions in us, and our im- 

 mortal soul that perceived them. 



* This lecture is intended not merely as an exposition of the Synthetic Philoso- 

 phy, but also as a history of its origin, and its relation to other systems, especially 

 to those of Hume and Kant. 



