Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy. 101 



ness, which we call resistance, extension, color, sound, or 

 odor. It can not be identified with mind, for that we know 

 only as the series of our own states of consciousness. 



Says Spencer : " If I am asked to frame a notion of mind, 

 divested of all those structural traits under which alone I 

 am conscious of mind in myself, I can not do it. . . . If, 

 then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an ' originat- 

 ing mind,' I must conceive this mind as having attributes 

 akin to those of the only mind I know, and without which 

 I can not conceive mind at all. ... I can not think of a 

 single series of states of consciousness as causing even the 

 relatively small groups of action going on over the earth's 

 surface. . . . How, then, is it possible for me to conceive 

 an ' original mind,' which I must represent to myself as a 

 single series of states of consciousness, working the infinitely 

 multiplied sets of changes simultaneously going on in worlds 

 too numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that 

 baffles imagination? If to account for this infinitude of 

 changes everywhere going on * mind ' must be conceived as 

 there under the guise of simple dynamics, then the reply is 

 that, to be so conceived, mind must be divested of all attri- 

 butes by which it is distinguished, and that when thus 

 divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception dis- 

 appears, the word ' mind ' stands for a blank." 



According to Spencer, force, matter, space, time, motion, 

 are but forms which the indeterminate substance assumes 

 in consciousness. But matter and movement he reduces 

 as is sufficiently evident from the foregoing to manifesta- 

 tions of force ; and space and time are cohesions one of 

 coexistence, the other of succession in the manifestations 

 of force. Force then remains the primary datum, but that 

 we know only as states of consciousness in other words, as 

 the changes in us produced by an absolute reality of which 

 in itself we know nothing. 



It may be well to illustrate a little more fully that, ac- 

 cording to Spencer, we know matter only as co-existent states 

 of consciousness : " A whiff of ammonia coming in contact 

 with the eyes produces a smart, getting into the nostrils 

 excites the consciousness we described as an intolerably 

 strong odor, being condensed on the tongue generates an 

 acrid taste, while ammonia applied in solution to a tender 

 part of the skin makes it burn, as we say." This illustra- 

 tion from Spencer's Principles of Psychology shows that 

 one and the same external agency produces m us different 



