102 Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy. 



sensations, according to the avenues through which it affects 

 our consciousness. Which of these feelings, so widely dif- 

 ferent, does the external cause resemble? Probably none 

 of them. What it is, independently of consciousness, we 

 never can know, owing to limitations imposed by the very 

 constitution of the human mind. 



The effects produced on our consciousness different feel- 

 ings can be compared and classified ; but how can we com- 

 pare and classify that of which nothing can be known ? 



Knowledge consists in the classification of experiences. 

 We observe distinctions existing between phenomena, and 

 group together those that are similar. Anything newly dis- 

 covered is known only when it can be classed with some 

 other thing which is known ; in other words, only when the 

 impressions it produces can be recognized as belonging to 

 an existing group of impressions. " Whence it is manifest 

 that a thing is perfectly known when it is in all respects 

 like certain things previously observed ; that in proportion 

 to the number of respects in which it is unlike them is the 

 extent to which it is unknown ; and that hence, when it has 

 absolutely no attribute in common with anything else, it 

 must be absolutely beyond the bounds of knowledge." With- 

 out distinction, which implies limitation, of course, knowl- 

 edge would be impossible. All that we can compare and 

 classify are phenomena, between which are distinguishable 

 various degrees of likeness and unlikeness. These phenom- 

 ena are effects produced in us by that which is manifested 

 objectively as matter and force, and subjectively as feeling 

 and thought. We can think of matter only in terms of 

 mind, as, indeed, we can think of mind only in terms of 

 matter. That of which both are manifestations can not be 

 known. " The antithesis of subject and object," says Spen- 

 cer, " never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, ren- 

 ders impossible all knowledge of that ultimate reality in 

 which subject and object are united." 



There are those who, after making use of the doctrine of 

 the relativity of knowledge to prove that we know only our 

 conscious states, deny or question the existence of any ob- 

 jective reality that produces these states. But relativity 

 implies object as well as subject, and it would have no 

 meaning unless there were existence, known only as it affects 

 us and unknown as pure object. The statement that a 

 house of a certain size, form, color, etc., is what it is con- 

 ceived to be only in relation to consciousness, implies that 



