120 Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy. 



hour's talk. He dwelt chiefly on the psychological side rather than 

 the physical. This was almost inevitable under existing circum- 

 stances, and no doubt the best, since Mr. Spencer's contributions 

 have been more notable and original here than in the physical domain. 

 In the latter he relied more on the work of eminent biologists like 

 Darwin and Huxley. All he has done is but a continuation of the 

 work of preceding philosophers. The doctrine of evolution is itself 

 an evolution, and was only synthetized by Mr. Spencer. It is in the 

 direct line of descent of the work of the best reasoners of all ages, 

 and only became possible in its present form after the advent of mod- 

 ern science. It is really a growth of the ages and not the work of a 

 day or even a century. It owes much to Kant, Berkeley, Reid, Hume, 

 and other great thinkers who have been mentioned to-night. It has 

 found allied truths in contending schools of thought, brought them 

 together and fused them into a harmonic whole. To understand it 

 correctly requires breadth of thought, abundance of data, and persist- 

 ent, hard mental work. Without these it remains as incomprehensible 

 as the higher mathematics to the non-educated. 



It is quite evident from Mr. Perrin's remarks that he has failed com- 

 pletely to grasp the basic principles of its psychology. There is a pons 

 asinoriim here that he has not crossed. This surprises me very much. 

 Himself a writer on philosophical subjects of acknowledged ability, 

 one would have expected better things from him here. What he has 

 said reveals the fact that the doctrine of the " unknowable " is un- 

 known to him except in name. He neither has grasped what Spencer 

 and his disciples mean by it, nor the significance of the facts upon 

 which it rests. Its basis is wholly physiological, and as an implication 

 it is imperative. All that it involves is a correct comprehension of the 

 nature and limitations of human sense and perception. To know what 

 we know, and how we know it, is to demonstrate what Mr. Perrin 

 denies. For him to characterize Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a 

 " farce " is only to reveal the sad limitations of his own mental grasp. 

 However much we may dissent from some of this great German's con- 

 clusions, we all must admit him to be one of the very ablest and most 

 profound reasoners the world has ever seen. Whoever attempts to 

 ignore or underestimate his work only discountenances his own prow- 

 ess. That he believed in " things in themselves " was but evidence 

 that he held the universe to be real instead of illusory. The pict- 

 ures in our brains have as causes substantial verities. Mr. Perrin 

 holds that real being is motion. " Things in themselves," he contends, 

 are mere motions. But motions of what? Of nothing, he maintains. 

 How many of you can picture to your minds motions of nothings ? 

 Reason rebels against being forced to accept such a thought, Are not 



