454 The Doctrine of Evolution. 



never misses an opportunity for attacking the doctrine that 

 mind can be explained as evolved from matter. But, in 

 spite of this, a great many people suppose that the gradual 

 evolution of mind must mean its evolution out of matter, 

 and are deaf to arguments of which they do not perceive 

 the bearing. Hence Mr. Spencer is so commonly accred- 

 ited with the doctrine which he so earnestly repudiates. 



But there is another reason why people are apt to sup- 

 pose the doctrine of evolution to be materialistic in its im- 

 plications. There are able writers who have done good 

 service in illustrating portions of the general doctrine, and 

 are at the same time avowed materialists. One may be a 

 materialist, whatever his scientific theory of things ; and to 

 such a person the materialism naturally seems to be a logical 

 consequence from the scientific theory. We have received 

 this evening a communication from Prof. Ernst Haeckel, 

 of Jena, in which he lays down five theses regarding the 

 doctrine of evolution : 



1. "The general doctrine appears to be already unas- 

 sailably founded. 



2. " Thereby every supernatural creation is completely 

 excluded. 



3. " Transformism and the theory of descent are insepa- 

 rable constituent parts of the doctrine of evolution. 



4. " The necessary consequence of this last conclusion is 

 the descent of man from a series of vertebrates." 



So far, very good ; we are within the limits of scientific 

 competence, where Prof. Haeckel is strong. But now, in 

 his fifth thesis, he enters the region of metaphysics the 

 transcendental region, which science has no competent 

 methods of exploring and commits himself to a dogmatic 

 assertion : 



5 " The belief in an ' immortal soul ' and in ' a personal 

 God ' are therewith " (i. e., with the four preceding state- 

 ments) " completely ununitable (vdllig unvereinbar)." 



Now, if Prof. Haeckel had contented himself with as- 

 serting that these two beliefs are not susceptible of scientific 

 demonstration ; if he had simply said that they are beliefs 

 concerning which a scientific man, in his scientific capacity, 

 ought to refrain from making assertions because Science 

 knows nothing whatever about the subject he would have 

 occupied an impregnable position. His fifth thesis would 

 have been as indisputable as his first four. But Prof. 

 Haeckel does not stop here. He declares virtually that, if 



