234 SCIENTIFIC METHOD AS 



for history are past, and unique : and the object of 

 historical evidence will be to make clear to our minds 

 that some particular event has actually taken place. The 

 form of an historical statement is as follows : at such and 

 such a place and time such and such an event occurred, 

 or so and so performed such and such an act. And the 

 question scientific history has to answer is this: Under 

 what conditions am I justified in believing these historical 

 statements ? 



At this point I would refer for a moment to the 

 interesting and brilliant lecture given by Mr. Flinders 

 Petrie in this room yesterday. He used words to this 

 effect : if all the written history of London were swept 

 away, it would be possible to reconstruct the history by 

 means of the material recovered by investigation. His 

 concluding words partially restored my confidence in my 

 own lecture : for they showed that there is a wide dis- 

 tinction between what he called social and individual 

 history : the former deals with the sequence of stages 

 through which a people has passed, and may be written 

 in general terms without individual names, dates, or 

 events. Individual history deals with the particular 

 details of name, date, and event through which the 

 social changes expressed themselves. I am concerned 

 to-day with these only. I want to deal with the facts 

 of ordinary experience as they occur, and to inquire into 

 the mental condition of persons who believe facts which 

 they did not themselves experience ; and the question is 

 mainly a logical one. 



Before we pass on to the question of the mental 

 attitude towards historical affirmations, I wish to men- 

 tion a point which is of some importance, owing to a 

 somewhat persistent habit of common speech. It is very 

 commonly assumed that there is a close parallel between 



