APPLIED TO HISTORY 239 



mental attitudes towards them, that of easy acquiescence, 

 and that of serious historical belief, and we must now 

 ask by what methods and arguments can we establish 

 the condition of historical belief, in cases where there 

 is reason for doubt or hesitation. 



In order to answer this question, let us turn back to 

 the instances of historic statement which we have just 

 considered and let me point out that the mere fact that 

 they are modern and ordinary is not sufficient to dis- 

 tinguish them from other facts in history. They occur 

 outside our experience, and we have to depend upon 

 human testimony in order to get at them. In the 

 present day we have special arrangements for the quick 

 spread of intelligence : a battle in Manchuria is reported 

 in London almost as soon as it is over, but less than 

 a hundred years ago it was some days before the Battle 

 of Waterloo could be known. The rapidity with which 

 we now gain information in some measure conceals from 

 us its character : it is historical, however, and our attitude 

 towards it is by no means unimportant for our purpose. 

 There is, nevertheless, a real difference between these 

 items of daily intelligence and the facts of history for which 

 we depend on documents, and it lies in a point to which 

 I have already called attention. In the modern cases 

 we are careless and indifferent in verification ; we are 

 ready to accept the testimony to hand because the 

 whole series of facts alleged to have occurred belongs 

 to a context which we, in large measure, understand. 

 Though the facts were outside our direct observation, 

 yet we live in the context in which they occurred. We 

 know the various elements in it : the scenery and furni- 

 ture are familiar : we know the probabilities : we have 

 a general view of what is likely and what is not. And 

 nothing marks more strikingly the effect of modern 



