208 ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 



instinctive behaviour differs from intelligent behaviour in 

 the rigidity of the routine and in the absence of awareness 

 of the end to be attained. In intelligent behaviour, as we 

 know it in ourselves, there is an awareness of ends as ends, 

 and there is a power of adapting old means to new ends. 

 But it is only by an argument from analogy that we can 

 speak about absence or presence of awareness, and even in 

 intelligent behaviour the degree of awareness varies greatly 

 in intensity. 



iVccording to Professor Bergson, instinct and intelligence 

 differ in kind and have evolved on divergent paths. The ways 

 of ants and bees cannot be described as intelligent. As Prof. 

 H. Wildon Carr puts it, ^' the fundamental difference lies 

 in the mode of apprehension of reality, and the kind of 

 knowledge that serves the activity of each ". " We can 

 never know what this instinctive knowledge is." But we 

 may approach it sympathetically in our power of intuition 

 — '^ a direct vision of reality that is not clothed, so to speak, 

 with the categories of the understanding ''. '' This reality 

 is the living activity itself apprehended as a real duration." 



One of the fundamental sentences in UEvolution Creatrice 

 is this : ^' The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, 

 has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature is to see in 

 vegetative, instinctive, and rational life three successive 

 degrees of the evolution of one- and the same tendency, 

 whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity 

 that has split up as it evolved. The difference between them 

 is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, of degree, 

 but of kind." To this, M. Bergson has, indeed, immediately 

 to add that intelligence and instinct are rarely to be caught 

 pure, for instinct is often accompanied by gleams of intelli- 

 gence (seen, for instance, when hive-bees nest in the open 



