228 THE PROBLEM OF BODY AND MIND 



values and the thought-life on the other. If we avoid the 

 three fatal errors of false simplicity just mentioned, it is 

 not perhaps of great moment what theory — monist or dual- 

 ist, parallelist or animist — we are led to adopt. We must 

 choose the interpretation which is most consistent with the 

 rest of our thinking and experience. 



What is familiar ground to the expert philosopher is full 

 of pitfalls alike to the biologist and to the man in the street, 

 and we probably do well to remind ourselves that the way 

 we put the question of the relation between mind and body 

 may be misleading. It is often asked: Is the body the real 

 thing and the mind a derivative illusion? Or is the mind 

 alone real and the body in some way dependent? These 

 questions are badly put, for both bodily activity and the 

 thought-life are real. A conviction of the actuality of the 

 body as an agent to be reckoned with need not imply that 

 the mind is in any way illusory. Nor need a conviction of 

 the reality of the mind, readily reached by any one who has 

 ever made up his mind, imply that the body is not substan- 

 tial and effective. The practical truth is, that what we call 

 the mind counts, and that what we call the body counts; or 

 perhaps that what counts is body-mind or mind-body. So 

 far there is general agreement. But are there two distinct 

 and disparate real activities — a player and an instrument, 

 so to speak, or is there one order including both bodily and 

 mental processes, metabolism and awareness of meaning? 

 Is there interaction of two orders of being, or correlation 

 within one order? (See Lloyd Morgan, 1915, p. 6.) 



We know ourselves by our senses as organisms; we know 

 ourselves also as thinking, feeling, purposing, endeavouring 

 beings. For immediate experience there is unity. For 

 scientific purposes, however, it seems almost necessary to 



