252 THE PROBLEM OF BODY AND MIND 



But the continuity argument presses us further. Since it 

 seems very likely that organisms arose upon this earth from 

 not-living materials, in a manner at present obscure, are we 

 to suppose that consciousness somehow entered ah extra into 

 the early organisms when they were as yet only beginning; 

 or that it was interpolated later when they attained to some 

 degree of complexity; or that the analogue of consciousness, 

 which some have called infra-consciousness, was present even 

 in the domain of the inorganic ? The desire for continuity 

 impels us to the speculation that even the inorganic raw 

 materials were psycho-physical. For in no case can we 

 think of consciousness arising out of motion, any more than 

 we can think of atoms uniting for love. 



There has been great progress in the course of evolution, 

 but on the identity hypothesis we think rather of potencies 

 being raised to higher powers than of the interpolation of 

 new faculties. Instead of insinuating a principle of life 

 ah extra when a suitable mixture of proteins had been some- 

 how synthesised, we suppose that a synthetic advance of 

 materials, which were ever more than motions, made be- 

 haviour possible. Instead of insinuating mind ah extra 

 when the organism became complex enough, we suppose that 

 the progressive differentiation and integration of what was 

 from the outset a psycho-physical being, by and by disclosed 

 another aspect of its inherent reality, and experimenting 

 with ideas became possible. And similarly with man's 

 rational discourse and with the amazing phenomena of 

 human society. 



Biological monism has been characterised as a relapse to 

 the old and crude metaphysics of hylozoism. Perhaps it is 

 nearer the hylopsychism of some of the New Eealists. " By 

 hylopsychism I mean the theory that — The potentiality 



