MIND IN EVOLUTION 517 



We are still at the stage of metaphor in regard to the 

 factors in the evolution of behaviour; but metaphor is less 

 dangerous than false simplicity. Our metaphorical picture 

 is this — the germ-cell just beginning to develop is an im- 

 plicit organism of great complexity, an individuality in the 

 one-cell phase of its being, a mind-body or body-mind tele- 

 scoped down. It varies, it makes experiments in internal 

 re-arrangement, in self-expression. It is a blind artist, its 

 sketches are submitted to the criticism of the fully-formed 

 organism, the seeing artist, who will put them in the proper 

 light and bring out what there is in them of value. 



If the Amoeba has in its small way a mind, an aspect 

 of itself corresponding to our mind, and if the Amoeba 

 uses it when it goes a-hunting, — two not unreasonable hypoth- 

 eses, — then it may be that the germ-cell has also its analogue 

 of mind — a not unreasonable hypothesis, since it develops 

 into a creature with a mind. And this leads us to the 

 hypothesis that the more momentous variations may be in- 

 explicable if we keep only one aspect of the germ-cell in 

 view. And if so, could there be a more relevant opportunity 

 for the mental side showing itself than in variations which 

 lead to new departures in behaviour? 



In any case, the hypothesis that hereditary organisation 

 of capacities of behaviour comes about by the entailment of 

 the results of individual practice, experimenting, and learn- 

 ing cannot be readily maintained. On the other hand, while 

 it is difficult to think clearly of the origin of great improve- 

 ments in behaviour by germinal variation, and of the relative 

 automatisation of them arising in the same way, there is 

 no special difficulty in understanding their persistence on 

 this theory. For variations that arise from within have 

 often great staying power in inheritance. 



