522 THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 



agree that fear or anticipation is adequately accounted for 

 in terms of physiology. Another strange thing is that Pro- 

 fessor Crile includes among the functions of his adaptive 

 mechanism ^' the fabrication of thought ". One might say 

 that it was not a good thought that Professor Crile's 

 mechanism fabricated when it conceived of the organism as 

 a mechanism ; but his position is theoretically impossible — 

 a contradiction in terms. 



The apsychic formulation seems unsound practically as 

 well as theoretically. On the theory that mind does not 

 count, we may make much of a horse or a dog, but certainly 

 not most. There is a great deal of sound sense, we think, 

 in the quaint words of one of the old breeders, Gervase 

 Markham (1621): "You shall beginne to handle and in- 

 struct your dogge at four months old; . . . make him most 

 loving and familiar with you, taking a delight in your com- 

 pany, also mix with this familiarity a kindly awe and obe- 

 dience which you shall procure rather by tenderness than by 

 terrefying him, which only maketh him sly.'' It is wrong 

 " ever to hurry your young dogge, give him time to fix 

 himself and much liberty of movement, handle him firmly 

 but tenderly." (Quoted by Dr. N. C. MacNamara in his 

 Instinct and Intelligence, 1915, p. 183.) 



There are two fallacies in the doctrine of the uselessness 

 of mind. In the first place, it ignores the fact that the process 

 of organisation (otherwise called automatisation and still 

 more unfortunately mechanisation) has the effect of increas- 

 ing efficiency at a higher level. It enables the creature to 

 meet novel circumstances, to experiment, to make a purpose- 

 ful use of its own experience, which is what we call intelli- 

 gence. Just as in our own life we practise labour-saving, 

 time-saving, worry-saving methodical devices, so as to have 



