MIND IN EVOLUTION 531 



sense stimuli, but to the changing phases of a complex situa- 

 tion. Is not this beyond physiologically explicable inertia 

 or momentum ? 



Those who believe that the only realities are objective 

 physical things and processes (the monistic panhylists) are 

 of course aware of the behaviour of the higher animals, but 

 they regard this as purely objective, leaving consciousness 

 out. Against this view many objections may be urged; Mr. 

 W. P. Montague states four (1912, p. 271). (1) We can be 

 conscious of our behaviour. ^' But if behaviour is itself 

 consciousnesSj there seems nothing left in terms of which 

 we can define the consciousness of behaviour." (2) '' Be- 

 haviour is always a movement or chain of movements in 

 space either of the organism as a whole or of something in 

 the organism, such as neural current. But the square root 

 of minus one of which we are conscious is not a bodily move- 

 ment, nor is our consciousness of the life of Julius Caesar." 

 (3) '^ All that is visible or profitably observable as behaviour 

 relates to movements, with which it is physiologically impos- 

 sible for consciousness to be identified or even directly cor- 

 related. For physiology teaches us that consciousness 

 depends upon, or is immediately and directly bound up with 

 neural currents which are always intra-organic, if not intra- 

 cortical." (4) " Finally, consciousness does at each moment 

 of a train of conscious behaviour have for its contents past 

 incidents of the behaviour that are no longer and future 

 incidents that are not yet." In short, it seems impossible 

 either to get rid of consciousness,— a strange ' psychophobia \ 

 or to define it in terms of any objective process. 



What is implied in saying that the mind counts in be- 

 haviour? What distinguishes an a6c-process, in which mind 

 operates, from an a6-process, such as a simple reflex action, 



