CONTENTS. 



Xlll 



PAGE 



§ 3. The description of an observation affirms 

 more than is contained, in the observa- 

 tion 452 



4. — namely, an agreement among phenom- 

 ena ; and the comparison of phenomena 

 to ascertain such agreements is a prelim- 

 inary to induction 453 



Chapter II. Of A bstraction, or the Formation of 

 Conceptions. 



§1. The comparison which is a preliminary to 



induction implies general conceptions. . . 455 



2. — but these need not be pre-existent 456 



3. A general conception, originally the result 



of a comparison, becomes itself the type 

 of comparison 45S 



4. What is meant by appropriate conceptions. 459 



5. — and by clear conceptions 461 



6. Farther illustration of the subject 462 



CuAPTEE III. Of Xaming aa Subsidiary to Induc- 

 tion. 



§ 1. The fundamental property of names as an 



instrument of thought 464 



2. Names are not indispensable to induc- 



tion 465 



3. In what manner subservient to it 465 



4. General names not a mere contrivance to 



economize the use of language 466 



Chapter IV. Of the Requisites of a Philosophical 

 Language, and the Principles of Definition. 



{ 1. First requisite of philosophical language, 

 a steady and determinate meaning for ev- 

 ery general name 467 



2. Names in common use have often a loose 



connotation 467 



3. — which the logician should fix, with as 



little alteration as possible 469 



4. Why definition is often a question not of 



words but of things 470 



6. How the logician should deal with the 



transitive applications of words 472 



6. Evil consequences of casting oflF any por- 

 tion of the customary connotation of 

 words 476 



Chapter V. On the Natural History of the Varia- 

 tions in the Meaning of Terms. 



§1. How circumstances originally accidental 

 become incorporated into the meaning of 

 words 480 



2. — and sometimes become the whole mean- 



ing 481 



3. Tendency of words to become generalized. 482 



4. — and to become specialized 485 



Chapter VI. The Principles of Philosophical Lan- 

 guage farther consiclered. 



§1. Second requisite of philosophicallanguage, 



a name for every important meaning 487 



2. — viz., first, an accurate descriptive ter- 



minology 487 



3. — secondly, a name for each of the more 



important results of scientific abstrac- 

 tion 490 



4. — thirdly, a nomenclature, or system of 



the names of Kinds 491 



5. Peculiar nature of the connotation of 



names which belong to a nomenclature,, 493 



PAGE 



§ 6. In what cases language may, and may not, 



be used mechanically 494 



Chapter VII, Of Classification, as Subsidiary to 

 Induction. 



§1. Classification as here treated of, wherein 

 different from the classification implied 

 in naming 497 



2. Theory of natural groups 498 



3. Are natural groups given by type, or by 



definition f 501 



4. Kinds are natural groups 502 



5. How the names of Kinds should be con- 



structed 505 



Chapter VIII. Of Classifiicatimi by Series. 



§1. Natural groups should be arranged in a 



natural series 507 



2. The arrangement should follow the de- 



grees of the main phenomenon 508. 



3. — which implies the assumption of a type 



species 509 



4. How the divisions of the series should be 



determined 510 



5. Zoology affords the completest type of sci- 



entific classification 611 



BOOK V, 



ON FALLACIES, 



Chapter I. Of Fallacies in General. 



Jl, Theory of fallacies a necessary part of 



logic 512 



2. Casual mistakes are not fallacies ^. . . 513 



3, The moral sources of erroneous opinion, 



how related to the intellectual 513 



Chapter II, Classification of Fallacies. 

 §1, On what criteria a classification of fallacies 



should be grounded 616 



2. The five classes of fallacies 616 



3. The reference of a fallacy to one or an- 



other class is sometimes arbitrary 518 



Chapter III. Fallacies of Simple Infection, or 

 A Priori Fallacies. 



51. Character of this class of fallacies 520 



2. Natural prejudice of mistaking subjective 



laws for objective, exemplified in popular 

 superstitions 521 



3. — that things which we think of together 



must exist together, and that what is in- 

 conceivable must be false 523 



4. — of ascribing objective existence to ab- 



abstractions 527 



6. Fallacy of the Sufficient Reason 528 



6. Natural prejudice, that the differences in 



nature correspond to the distinctions in 

 language 529 



7. Prejudice, that a phenomenon can not have 



more than one cause 532 



8. — that the conditions of a phenomenon 



must resemble the phenomenon 533 



Chapter IV. Fallacies of Observation. 

 51. Non-observation, and Mal-observation 538 



