NECESSITY OF AN ANALYSIS OF NAMES. 2^ 



But there is another reason, of a still more fundamental nature, why the 

 import of Avords should be the earliest subject of the logician's considera- 

 tion : because without it he can not examine into the import of Proposi- 

 tions. Now this is a subject which stands on the very threshold of the 

 science of logic. 



The object of logic, as defined in the Introductory Chapter, is to ascer- 

 tain how we come by that portion of our knowledge (much the greatest 

 portion) which is not intuitive : and by what criterion we can, in matters 

 not self-evident, distinguish between things proved and things not proved, 

 betAveen what is Avorthy and what is unAvorthy of belief. Of the various 

 questions Avhich present themselves to our inquiring faculties, some receive 

 an ansAver from direct consciousness, others, if resolved at all, can only be 

 resolved by means of evidence. Logic is concerned Avith these last. But 

 before inquiring into the mode of resolving questions, it is necessary to in- 

 quire what are those which offer themselves ; Avhat questions are conceiA'a- 

 ble ; Avhat inquiries are there, to Avhich mankind have either obtained, or 

 been able to imagine it possible that they should obtain, an ansAver. This 

 point is best ascertained by a survey and analysis of Propositions. 



§ 2. The answer to every question Avhich it is possible to frame, must 

 be contained in a Proposition, or Assertion. Whatever can be an object 

 of belief, or even of disbelief, must, when put into words, assume the form 

 of a proposition. All truth and all error lie in propositions. What, by 

 a convenient misapplication of an abstract term, we call a Truth, means 

 simply a True Proposition ; and errors are false propositions. To know 

 the import of all possible propositions would be to knoAV all questions 

 which can be raised, all matters which are susceptible of being either be- 

 licA'ed or disbelicA^ed. How many kinds of inquiries can be propound- 

 ed; hoAV many kinds of judgments can be made; and hoAV many kinds 

 of propositions it is possible to frame Avith a meaning, are but different 

 forms of one and the same question. Since, then, the objects of all Be- 

 lief and of all Inquiry express themseh'es in propositions, a sufficient scru- 

 tiny of Propositions and of their varieties will aj^prise us what questions 

 mankind have actually asked of themselves, and Avhat, in the nature of an- 

 swers to those questions, they have actually thought they had grounds to 

 believe. 



Now the first glance at a proposition shows that it is formed by putting 

 together two names. A proposition, according to the common simple defi- 

 nition, Avhich is sufficient for our purpose is, discourse, in which something 

 is affirmed or denied of something. Thus, in the proposition. Gold is yel- 

 loAv, the quality yelloio is affirmed of the substance gold. In the proposi- 

 tion, Franklin was not born in England, the fact expressed by the words 

 born in England is denied of the man Franklin. 



Every proposition consists of three parts: the Subject, the Predicate, 

 and the Copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is affirmed 

 or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or thing which 

 something is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign denoting that 

 there is an affirmation or denial, and thereby enabling the hearer or reader 

 to distinguish a proposition from any other kind of discourse. Thus, in the 

 proposition. The earth is round, the Predicate is the word ro^^wc?, Avhich de- 

 notes the quality affirmed, or (as the phrase is) predicated : the earth, AVords 

 denoting the object Avhich that quality is affirmed of, compose the Subject ; 

 the Avord is, Avhich serves as the connecting mark between the subject and 



