28 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



predicate, to show that one of them is affirmed of the other, is called the 

 Copula. 



Dismissing, for the present, the copula, of which more will be said here- 

 after, every proposition, then, consists of at least two names — brings to- 

 gether two names, in a particular manner. This is already a first step to- 

 ward what we are in quest of. It appears from this, that for an act of be- 

 lief, one object is not sufficient ; the simplest act of belief supposes, and has 

 something to do with, two objects — two names, to say the least ; and (since 

 the names must be names of something) two namable things. A large 

 class of thinkers would cut the matter short by saying, two ideas. They 

 Avould say, that the subject and predicate are both of them names of ideas; 

 the idea of gold, for instance, and the idea of yellow ; and that what takes 

 place (or part of what takes place) in the act of belief consists in bring- 

 ing (as it is often expi'essed) one Of these ideas under the other. But this 

 we are not yet in a condition to say : whether such be the correct mode 

 of describing the phenomenon, is an after consideration. The result with 

 which for the present we must be contented, is, that in every act of belief 

 tioo objects ai'e in some manner taken cognizance of; that there can be no 

 belief claimed, or question propounded, which does not embrace two dis- 

 tinct (either material or intellectual) subjects of thought; each of them 

 capable, or not, of being conceived by itself, but incapable of being believed 

 by itself. 



I may say, for instance, " the sun." The word has a meaning, and sug- 

 gests that meaning to the mind of any one who is listening to me. But 

 suppose I ask him, Whether it is true : whether he believes it ? He can 

 give no answer. There is as yet nothing to believe, or to disbelieve. Now, 

 however, let me make, of all possible assertions respecting the sun, the one 

 which involves the least of reference to any object besides itself; let me 

 say, " the sun exists." Here, at once, is something which a person can say 

 he believes. But here, instead of only one, we find two distinct objects of 

 conception : the sun is one object ; existence is another. Let it not be said 

 that this second conception, existence, is involved in the first; for the sun 

 may be conceived as no longer existing. "The sun" does not convey all 

 the meaning that is conveyed by "the sun exists:" "'my father" does not 

 include all the meaning of " my father exists," for he may be dead ; " a 

 round square" does not include the meaning of "a round square exists," 

 for it does not and can not exist. When I say " the sun," " my father," or 

 a " round square," I do not call upon the hearer for any belief or disbelief, 

 nor can either the one or the other be afforded me ; but if I say, " the sun 

 exists," " my father exists," or " a round square exists," I call for belief ; 

 and should, in the first of the three instances, meet with it; in the second, 

 with belief or disbelief, as the case might be ; in the third, with disbelief. 



§ 3. This first step in the analysis of the object of belief, which, though 

 so obvious, will be found to be not unimportant, is the only one which wo 

 shall find it practicable to make without a preliminary survey of language. 

 If we attempt to proceed further in the same path, that is, to analyze any 

 further the import of Propositions ; we find forced upon us, as a subject of 

 previous consideration, the import of Names. For every proposition con- 

 sists of two names ; and every proposition affirms or denies one of these 

 names, of the other. Now what we do, what passes in our mind, when we 

 affirm or deny two names of one another, must depend on what they are 

 names of; since it is with reference to that, and not to the mere names 



