30 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



to make it known to others, appears unexceptionable. Names, indeed, do 

 much more than this ; but Avhatever else they do, grows out of, and is the 

 result of this : as will appear in its proper place. 



Are names more properly said to be the names of things, or of our ideas 

 of things? The first is the expression in common use; the last is that of 

 some metaphysicians, who conceived that in adopting it they were intro- 

 ducing a highly important distinction. The eminent thinker, just quoted, 

 seems to countenance the latter opinion. "But seeing," he continues, 

 " names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, it 

 is manifest they are not signs of the things themselves; for that the sound 

 of this word st07ie should be the sign of a stone, can not be understood in 

 any sense but this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it 

 thinks of a stone." 



If it be merely meant that the conception alone, and not the thing itself, 

 is recalled by the name, or imparted to the hearer, this of course can not 

 be denied. Nevertheless, there seems good reason for adhering to the 

 common usage, and calling (as indeed Hobbes himself does in other places) 

 the word sun the name of the sun, and not the name of our idea of the 

 sun. For names are not intended only to make the hearer conceive what 

 we conceive, but also to inform him what we believe. Now, when I use a 

 name for the purpose of expressing a belief, it is a belief concerning the 

 thing itself, not concerning my idea of it. When I say, "the sun is the 

 cause of day," I do not mean that my idea of the sun causes or excites in 

 me the idea of day ; or in other words, that thinking of the sun makes me 

 think of day. I mean, that a certain physical fact, which is called the sun's 

 presence (and which, in the ultimate analysis, resolves itself into sensations, 

 not ideas) causes another physical fact, which is called day. It seems prop- 

 er to consider a word as the name of that which we intend to be under- 

 stood by it when we use it ; of that which any fact that we assert of it is 

 to be understood of; that, in short, concerning which, when we employ the 

 word, we intend to give information. Names, therefore, shall always be 

 spoken of in this work as the names of things themselves, and not merely 

 of our ideas of things. 



But the question now arises, of what things ? and to answer this it is 

 necessary to take into consideration the different kinds of names. 



§ 2. It is usual, before examining the various classes into which names 

 are commonly divided, to begin by distinguishing from names of every 

 description, those words which are not names, but only parts of names. 

 Among such are reckoned particles, as o/", to, truly, often; the inflected 

 cases of nouns substantive, as me, him, tTohn'^s ; and even adjectives, as 

 large, heavy. These words do not express things of which any thing can 

 be affirmed or denied. We can not say, Heavy fell, or A heavy fell ; Truly, 

 or A truly, was asserted; Of, or An of, was in the room. Unless, indeed, 

 we are speaking of the mere words themselves, as when we say. Truly is 

 an English word, or. Heavy is an adjective. In that case they are complete 

 names — viz., names of those particular sounds, or of those particular col- 

 lections of written characters. This employment of a word to denote the 

 mere letters and syllables of which it is composed, was termed by the 

 schoolmen the suppositio materialis of the word. In any other sense we 

 can not introduce one of these words into the subject of a proposition, 

 unless in combination with other words ; as, A heavy body fell, A trtily 

 important fact was asserted, A member oi parliament was in the room. 



