40 NAMES AND PKOPOSITIONS. 



ficial similarity, giving to each new object the name of that familiar object, 

 the idea of Avhich it most readily recalls, or which, on a cursory inspection, 

 it seems to them most to resemble : as an unknown substance found in the 

 ground will be called, according to its texture, earth, sand, or a stone. In 

 this manner, names creep on from subject to subject, until all traces of 

 a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word comes to denote 

 a number of things not only independently of any common attribute, 

 but which have actually no attribute in common; or none but what is 

 shared by other things to which the name is capriciously refused.* Even 

 scientific writers have aided in this perversion of general language from 

 its pui'pose; sometimes because, like the vulgar, they knew no better; 

 and sometimes in deference to that aversion to admit new words, which 

 induces mankind, on ,all subjects not considered technical, to attempt to 

 make the original stock of names serve with but little augmentation to 

 express a constantly increasing number of objects and distinctions, and, 

 consequently, to express them in a manner progressively more and more 

 imperfect. 



To what a degree this loose mode of classing and denominating objects 

 has rendered the vocabulary of mental and moral philosophy unfit for the 

 purposes of accurate thinking, is best known to whoever has most medi- 

 tated on the present condition of those branches of knowledge. Since, 

 however, the introduction of a new technical language as the vehicle of 

 speculations on subjects belonging to the domain of daily discussion, is ex- 

 tremely difficult to effect, and would not be free from inconvenience even 

 if effected, the problem for the philosopher, and one of the most difficult 

 which he has to resolve, is, in retaining the existing phraseology, how best 

 to alleviate its imperfections. This can only be accomplished by giving to 

 every general concrete name which there is frequent occasion to predicate, 

 a definite and fixed connotation ; in order that it may be known what attri- 

 butes, when we call an object by that name, we really mean to predicate of 

 the object. And the question of most nicety is, how to give this fixed con- 

 notation to a name, with the least possible change in the objects which the 

 name is habitually employed to denote; with the least possible disarrange- 

 ment, either by adding or subtraction, of the group of objects which, in 

 however imperfect a manner, it serves to circumscribe and hold together ; 

 and with the least vitiation of the truth of any propositions which are com- 

 monly received as true. 



This desirable purpose, of giving a fixed connotation where it is want- 

 ing, is the end aimed at whenever any one attempts to give a definition of 

 a general name already in use ; every definition of a connotative name be- 

 ing an attempt either merely to declare, or to declare and analyze, the con- 

 notation of the name. And the fact, that no questions which have arisen 

 in the moral sciences have been subjects of keener controversy than the 



* "Take the familiar term Stone. It is applied to mineral and rocky materials, to the 

 kernels of fruit, to the accmnulations in the gall-bladder and in the kidney ; while it is re- 

 fused to polished minerals (called gems), to rocks that have the cleavage suited for roofing 

 (slates), and to baked clay (bricks). It occurs in the designation of the magnetic oxide of 

 iron (loadstone), and not in speaking of other metallic ores. Such a term is wlioUy unfit for 

 accurate reasoning, unless hedged round on eveiy occasion by other phrases; as building 

 stone, precious stone, gall-stone, etc. Moreover, the methods of definition are baffled for 

 want of sufficient community to ground upon. There is no quality uniformly present in the 

 cases where it is applied, and uniformly absent where it is not applied ; hence the dcfiner 

 would have to employ largely the license of striking off existing applications, and taking in 

 new ones." — Bain, Logic, ii., 171*. 



