THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 49 



is here to be included whatever we are internally conscious of when we are 

 said to think ; from the consciousness we have when we think of a red col- 

 or without having it before our eyes, to the most recondite thoughts of a 

 philosopher or poet. Be it remembered, however, that by a thought is to 

 be understood what passes in the mind itself, and not any object external 

 to the mind, which the person is commonly said to be thinking of. He may 

 be thinking of the sun, or of God, but the sun and God are not thoughts; 

 his mental image, however, of the sun, and his idea of God, are thoughts; 

 states of his mind, not of the objects themselves; and so also is his belief 

 of the existence of the sun, or of God ; or his disbelief, if the case be so. 

 Even imaginary objects (which are said to exist only in our ideas) are to be 

 distinguished from our ideas of them. I may think of a hobgoblin, as I may 

 think of the loaf which was eaten yesterday, or of the flower which will 

 bloom to-morrow. But the hobgoblin which never existed is not the same 

 thing with my idea of a hobgoblin, any more than the loaf which once ex- 

 isted is the same thing with my idea of a loaf, or the flower which does not 

 yet exist, but which will exist, is the same with my idea of a flower. They 

 are all, not thoughts, but objects of thought; though at the present time all 

 the objects are alike non-existent. 



In like manner, a Sensation is to be carefully distinguished from the ob- 

 ject which causes the sensation; our sensation of white from a white object: 

 nor is it less to be distinguished from the attribute whiteness, which we 

 ascribe to the object in consequence of its exciting the sensation. Unfor- 

 tunately for clearness and due discrimination in considering these subjects, 

 our sensations seldom receive separate names. We have a name for the 

 objects which produce in us a certain sensation : the word white. We 

 have a name for the quality in those objects, to which we ascribe the sen- 

 sation : the name tohiteness. But when we speak of the sensation itself 

 (as we have not occasion to do this often except in our scientific specula- 

 tions), language, which adapts itself for the most part only to the common 

 uses of life, has provided us with no single-worded or immediate designa- 

 tion ; we must employ a circumlocution, and say. The sensation of white, 

 or The sensation of whiteness; we must denominate the sensation either 

 from the object, or from the attribute, by which it is excited. Yet the 

 sensation, though it never does, might very well be conceived to exist, with- 

 out any thing whatever to excite it. We can conceive it as arising spon- 

 taneously in the mind. But if it so arose, we should have no name to de- 

 note it which would not be a misnomer. In the case of our sensations of 

 hearing we are better provided; we have the word Sound, and a whole 

 vocabulary of words to denote the various kinds of sounds. For as we 

 are often conscious of these sensations in the absence of any perceptible 

 object, we can more easily conceive having them in the absence of any 

 object whatever. We need only shut our eyes and listen to music, to have 

 1 conception of a universe with nothing in it except sounds, and ourselves 

 hearing them: and what is easily conceived separately, easily obtains a 

 separate name. But in general our names of sensations denote indiscrim- 

 nately the sensation and the attribute. Thus, color stands for the sensa- 

 ions of white, red, etc., but also for the quality in the colored object. We 

 ;alk of the colors of things as among thoir properties. 



§ 4. In the case of sensations, another distinction lias also to be kept in 

 iew, which is often confounded, and never without mischievous conse- 

 [uences. This is, the distinction between the sensation itself, and the state 



4 



