THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 51 



To the same region of speculation belongs all that can be said respecting 

 the distinction which the German metaphysicians and their French and 

 English followers so elaborately draw between the acts of the mind and its 

 merely passive states; between what it receives from, and what it gives to, 

 the crude materials of its experience. I am aware that with reference to 

 the view which those writers take of the primary elements of thought and 

 knowledge, this distinction is fundamental. But for the present purpose, 

 which is to examine, not the original groundwork of our knowledge, but 

 how we come by that portion of it which is not original ; the difference be- 

 tween active and passive states of mind is of secondary importance. For 

 us, they all ai-e states of mind, they all ai"e feelings ; by which, let it be 

 said once more, I mean to imply nothing of passivity, but simply that they 

 are psychological facts, facts which take place in the mind, and are to be 

 carefully distinguished from the external or physical facts with which they 

 may be connected either as effects or as causes. 



§ 5. Among active states of mind, there is, however, one species which 

 merits particular attention, because it forms a principal part of the conno- 

 tation of some important classes of names. I mean volitions, or acts of 

 the will. When we speak of sentient beings by relative names, a large 

 portion of the connotation of the name usually consists of the actions of 

 those beings ; actions past, present, and possible or probable future. Take, 

 for instance, the words Sovereign and Subject. What meaning do these 

 words convey, but that of innumerable actions, done or to be done by the 

 sovereign and the subjects, to or in regard to one another reciprocally ? 

 So with the words physician and patient, leader and follower, tutor and 

 pupil. In many cases the words also connote actions which would be 

 done under certain contingencies by persons other than those denoted : as 

 the words mortgagor and mortgagee, obligor and obligee, and many other 

 words expressive of legal relation, which connote what a court of justice 

 Avould do to enforce the legal obligation if not fulfilled. There are also 

 words which connote actions previously done by persons other than those 

 denoted either by the name itself or by its correlative ; as the word brothei*. 

 From these instances, it may be seen how large a portion of the connota- 

 tion of names consists of actions. Now what is an action ? Not one thing, 

 but a series of two things : the state of mind called a volition, followed by 

 an effect. The volition or intention to produce the effect, is one thing; 

 the effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing ; the 

 two together constitute the action. I form the purpose of instantly mov- 

 ing my ariti ; that is a state of my mind : my arm (not being tied or par- 

 alytic) moves in obedience to my purpose ; that is a physical fact, conse- 

 quent on a state of mind. The intention, followed by the fact, or (if we 

 prefer the expression) the fact when preceded and caused by the intention, 

 is called the action of moving my arm. 



§ 6. Of the first leading division of namable things, viz.. Feelings or 

 States of Consciousness, we began by recognizing three subdivisions ; Sen- 

 sations, Thoughts, and Emotions. The first two of these we have illustrated 

 at considerable length ; the third. Emotions, not being perplexed by similar 

 ambiguities, does not require similar exemplification. And, finally, we have 

 found it necessary to add to these three a fourth species, commonly known 

 by the name Volitions. We shall now proceed to the two remaining class- 

 es of namable things; all things which are regarded as external to the 



