52 NAMES AND PKOPOSITIONS. 



mind being considered as belonging either to the class of Substances or to 

 that of Attributes. 



II. Substances. 



Logicians have endeavored to define Substance and Attribute ; but their 

 definitions are not so much attempts to draw a distinction between the 

 things themselves, as instructions what difference it is customary to make 

 in the grammatical structure of the sentence, according as we are speak- 

 ing of substances or of attributes. Such definitions are rather lessons of 

 English, or of Greek, Latin, or German, than of mental philosophy. An 

 attribute, say the school logicians, must be the attribute of something; 

 color, for example, must be the color of something ; goodness must be the 

 goodness of something; and if this something should cease to exist, or 

 should cease to be connected with the attribute, the existence of the attri- 

 bute would be at an end. A substance, on the contrary, is self-existent ; in 

 speaking about it, we need not put of after its name. A stone is not the 

 stone o/any thing; the moon is not the moon o/any thing, but simply the 

 moon. Unless, indeed, the name which we choose to give to the substance 

 be a relative name ; if so, it must be followed either by o/, or by some 

 other particle, implying, as that preposition does, a reference to something 

 else: but then the other characteristic peculiarity of an attribute would 

 fail ; the something might be destroyed, and the substance might still sub- 

 sist. Thus, a father must be the father of something, and so far resembles 

 an attribute, in being referred to something besides himself : if there were 

 no child, there would be no father: but this, when we look into the matter, 

 only means that we should not call him father. The man called father 

 might still exist though there were no child, as he existed before there was 

 a child ; and thei*e would be no contradiction in supposing him to exist, 

 though the whole universe except himself were destroyed. But destroy 

 all white substances, and where would be the attribute whiteness? White- 

 ness, without any white thing, is a contradiction in terms. 



This is the nearest approach to a solution of the difficulty, that will be 

 found in the common treatises on logic. It will scarcely be thought to be 

 a satisfactory one. If an attribute is distinguished from a substance by 

 being the attribute of something, it seems highly necessary to understand 

 what is meant by of ; a particle which needs explanation too much itself, 

 to be placed in front of the explanation of any thing else. And as for the 

 self-existence of substance, it is very true that a substance may be con- 

 ceived to exist without any other substance, but so also may an attribute 

 without any other attribute : and we can no more imagine a substance 

 without attributes than we can imagine attributes without a substance. 



Metaphysicians, however, have probed the question deeper, and given an 

 account of Substance considerably more satisfactoiy than this. Substances 

 are usually distinguished as Bodies or Minds. Of each of these, philoso- 

 phers have at length provided us with a definition which seems unexcep- 

 tionable. 



§ 7. A body, according to the received doctrine of modern metaphysi- 

 cians, may be defined, the external cause to which we ascribe our sensa- 

 tions. When I see and touch a piece of gold, I am conscious of a sensa- 

 tion of yellow color, and sensations of hai'dness and weight ; and by vary- 

 ing the mode of handling, I may add to these sensations many others com- 

 pletely distinct from them. The sensations are all of which I am directly 



