THmGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 55 



accidentally revealed to us, through certain qualities related to our faculties 

 of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we can not think as uncondition- 

 al, irrelative, existent in and of ourselves. All that we know is therefore 

 phenomenal — phenomenal of the unknown."* The same doctrine is laid 

 down in the clearest and strongest terms by M. Cousin, whose observations 

 on the subject are the more worthy of attention, as, in consequence of the 

 ultra-German and ontological character of his philosophy in other respects, 

 they may be regarded as the admissions of an opponent. f 



There is not the slightest reason for believing that what we call the sen- 

 sible qualities of the object are a type of any thing inherent in itself, or 

 bear any affinity to its own nature. A cause does not, as such, resemble 

 its effects ; an east wind is not like the feeling of cold, nor heat like the 

 steam of boiling water. Why then should matter resemble our sensations? 

 Why should the inmost nature of fire or water resemble the impressions 

 made by those objects upon our senses ?J Or on what principle are we 



* It is to be regretted that Sir William Hamilton, though he often strenuously insists on 

 this doctrine, and though, in the passage quoted, he states it with a comprehensiveness, and 

 force which leave nothing to be desired, did not consistently adhere to his own doctrine, but 

 maintained along with it opinions with which it is utterly irreconcilable. See the third and 

 other chapters oi' An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. 



t "Nous Savons qu'il existe quelque chose hors de nous, parceque nous ne pouvons expli- 

 quer nos perceptions sans les rattacher a des causes distinctes de nous memes ; nous savons 

 de plus que ces causes, dont nous ne connaissons pas d'ailleurs I'essence, produisent les effets 

 les plus variables, les plus divers, et meme les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle 

 nature ou telle disposition du sujet. Mais savons-nous quelque chose de plus ? et meme, vu 

 le caractere indetermine des causes que nous concevons dans les corps, y a-t-il quelque chose 

 de plus a savoir? Y a-t-il lieu de nous enqueiir si nous percevons les choses telles qu'elles 



sont? Non evidemment Je ne dis pas que le probleme est insoluble, ^e dis 



qu'il est ahsurde et enferme une contradiction. Nous ne savons pas ce que ces causes sont en 

 elles-memes, et la raison nous defend de chercher a le connaitre : mais il est bien evident a 

 priori, qu'elles ne sont pas en elles-memes ce qu'elles sont par rapport a nous, puisque la pi e'- 

 sence du sujet modifie necessairement leur action. Supprimez tout sujet sentant, il est certain 

 que ces causes agiraient encore puisqu'elles continueraient d'exister; mais elles agiraient au- 

 trement ; elles seraient encore des qualites et des proprieies, mais qui ne ressembleraient a 

 rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des proprietes que nous 

 lui connaissons : que serait-il ? C'est ce que nous ne saurons jamais. C'est d'ailleurs peut- 

 etre un probleme qui ne repugne pas seulement a la nature de notre esprit, mais a Vessence meme 

 des choses. Quand meme en effet on supprimerait par le pense'e tons les sujets sentants, il 

 faudrait encore admettre que nul corps ne manifesterait ses propriete's autrement qu'en rela- 

 tion avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas ses proprietes ne seraient encore que relatives: 

 en sorte qu'il me parait fort raisonnable d'admettre que les propriete's determinees des corps 

 n'existent pas independaniment d'un sujet quelconque, et que quand on demande si les pro- 

 prietes de la matiere sont telles que nous les percevons, il faudrait voir auparavant si elles sont 

 m tant que determinees, et dans quel sens il est vrai de dire qu'elles sont." — Cours d'Histoire 

 de la Philosophie Morale au 18?«e siecle, 8me le9on. 



X An attempt, indeed, has been made by Reid and others, to establish that although some 

 )f the properties we ascribe to objects exist only in our sensations, others exist in the things 

 hemselves, being such as can not possibly be copies of any impression upon the senses ; and 

 hey ask, from what sensations our notions of extension and figure have been derived? The 

 ;auntlet thrown down by Reid was taken up by Brown, who, applying greater powers of anal- 

 sis than had previously been applied to the notions of extension and figure, pointed out that 

 he sensations from which those notions are derived, are sensations of touch, combined with 

 ensations of a class previously too little adverted to by metaphysicians, those which have their 

 eat in our muscular frame. His analysis, which was adopted and followed up by James Mill, 

 las been further and greatly improved upon in Professor Bain's profound work, The Senses 

 md the Intellect, and in the chapters on "Perception "of a work of eminent analytic power, 

 »fr. Herbert'Spencer's Principles of Psychology. 



On this point M. Cousin may again be cited in favor of the better doctrine. M. Cousin 

 ecognizes, in opposition to Reid, the essential subjectivity of our conceptions of what are called 

 he primary qualities of matter, as extension, solidity, etc., equally with those of color, heat, 

 nd the remainder of the so-called secondary qualities. — Cours, ut supra, 9me le9on. 



