60 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



proportion as the fact into which the two objects enter as parts is of a 

 more special and peculiar, or of a more complicated nature, so also is the 

 relation grounded upon it. And there are as many conceivable relations 

 as there are conceivable kinds of fact in which two things can be jointly 

 concerned. 



In the same manner, therefore, as a quality is an attribute grounded on 

 the fact that a certain sensation or sensations are produced in las by the 

 object, so an attribute grounded on some fact into which the object enters 

 jointly with another object, is a relation between it and that other object. 

 But the fact in the latter case consists of the very same kind of elements 

 as the fact in the former; namely, states of consciousness. In the case, 

 for example, of any legal relation, as debtor and creditor, principal and 

 agent, guardian and ward, the fundmnentum relationis consists entirely of 

 thoughts, feelings, and volitions (actual or contingent), either of the persons 

 themselves or of other persons concerned in the same series of transactions ; 

 as, for instance, the intentions which would be formed by a judge, in case 

 a complaint were made to his tribunal of the infringement of any of the 

 legal obligations imposed by the relation ; and the acts which the judge 

 would perform in consequence ; acts being (as Ave have already seen) an- 

 other word for intentions followed by an effect, and that effect being but 

 another word for sensations, or some other feelings, occasioned either to 

 the agent himself or to somebody else. There is no part of what the names 

 expressive of the relation imply, that is not resolvable into states of con- 

 sciousness ; outward objects being, no doubt, supposed throughout as the 

 causes by which some of those states of consciousness are excited, and 

 minds as the subjects by which all of them ai-e experienced, but neither 

 the external objects nor the minds making their existence known other- 

 wise than by the states of consciousness. 



Cases of relation are not always so complicated as those to Avhich we 

 last alluded. The simplest of all cases of relation are those expressed by 

 the words antecedent and consequent, and by the word simultaneous. If 

 we say, for instance, that dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in Avhich the two 

 things, dawn and sunrise, were jointly concerned, consisted only of the two 

 things themselves; no third thing entered into the fact or phenomenon at 

 all. Unless, indeed, we choose to call the succession of the two objects a 

 third thing; but their succession is not something added to the things 

 themselves ; it is something involved in them. Dawn and sunrise announce 

 themselves to our consciousness by two successive sensations. Our con- 

 sciousness of the succession of these sensations is not a third sensation or 

 feeling added to them ; we have not first the two feelings, and then a feel- 

 ing of their succession. To have two feelings at all, implies having them 

 either successively, or else simultaneously. Sensations, or other feelings, 

 being given, succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions, to the 

 alternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties ; and 

 no one has been able, or needs expect, to analyze the matter any further. 



§ 11. In a somewhat similar position are two other sorts of relations. 

 Likeness and Unlikeness. I have two sensations ; we will suppose them 

 to be simple ones; two sensations of white, or one sensation of white and 

 another of black. I call the first two sensations like; the last two unlike. 

 What is the fact or phenomenon constituting the fimclamentum of this 

 relation ? The two sensations first, and then what we call a feeling of re- 

 semblance, or of want of resemblance. Let us confine ourselves to the fcr- 



