THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 61 



nier case. Resemblance is evidently a feeling ; a state of the consciousness 

 of the observer. Whether the feeling of the resemblance of the two colors 

 be a third state of consciousness, which I have after having the two sensa- 

 tions of color, or whether (like the feeling of their succession) it is involved 

 in the sensations themselves, may be a matter of discussion. But in either 

 case, these feelings of resemblance, and of its opposite dissimilarity, are 

 parts of our nature ; and parts so far from being capable of analysis, that 

 they are presupposed in every attempt to analyze any of our other feelings. 

 Likeness and unlikeness, therefore, as well as antecedence, sequence, and 

 simultaneousness, must stand apart among relations, as things sui generis. 

 They are attributes grounded on facts, that is, on states of consciousness, 

 but on states which are peculiar, unresolvable, and inexplicable. 



But, though likeness or unlikeness can not be resolved into any thing 

 else, complex cases of likeness or unlikeness can be resolved into simpler 

 ones. When we say of two things which consist of parts, that they are 

 like one another, the likeness of the wholes does admit of analysis ; it is 

 compounded of likenesses between the various parts respectively, and of 

 likeness in their arrangement. Of how vast a variety of resemblances of 

 parts must that resemblance be composed, which induces us to say that a 

 portrait, or a landscape, is like its original. If one person mimics another 

 with any success, of how many simple likenesses must the general or com- 

 plex likeness be compounded : likeness in a succession of bodily postures ; 

 likeness in voice, or in the accents and intonations of the voice; likeness 

 in the choice of words, and in the thoughts or sentiments expressed, wheth- 

 er by word, countenance, or gesture. 



All likeness and unlikeness of which we have any cognizance, resolve 

 themselves into likeness and unlikeness between states of our own, or some 

 other, mind. When we say that one body is like another, (since we know 

 nothing of bodies but the sensations which they excite,) we mean really 

 that there is a resemblance between the sensations excited by the two 

 bodies, or between some portions at least of those sensations. If we say 

 that two attributes are like one another (since we know nothing of attri- 

 butes except the sensations or states of feeling on whicli they are ground- 

 ed), we mean really that those sensations, or states of feeling, resemble each 

 other. We may also say that two relations are alike. The fact of resem- 

 blance between relations is sometimes called analogy, forming one of the 

 aumerous meanings of that word. The relation in which Priam stood to 

 Hector, namely, that of father and son, resembles the relation in which 

 Philip stood to Alexander ; resembles it so closely that they ai-e called the 

 iame relation. The relation in which Cromwell stood to England resem- 

 )les the relation in which Napoleon stood to France, though not so closely 

 is to be called the same relation. The meaning in both these instances 

 nust be, that a resemblance existed between the facts which constituted 

 he fundamentum relationis. 



This resemblance may exist in all conceivable gradations, from perfect 

 mdistinguishableness to something extremely slight. When we say, that 

 ; thought suggested to the mind of a person of genius is like a seed cast 

 i ito the ground, because the former produces a multitude of other thoughts, 

 : nd the latter a multitude of other seeds, this is saying that between the 

 1 alation of an inventive mind to a thought contained in it, and the relation 

 < f a fertile soil to a seed contained in it, there exists a resemblance : the 

 1 aal resemblance being in the two funclamenta relationis, in each of which 

 1 lere occurs a germ, producing by its development a multitude of other 



