64 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



is always in virtue of resemblance or succession or simultaneity in the sen- 

 sations or states of consciousness which those objects excite, and on which 

 those attributes are grounded. 



§ 14. In the preceding investigation we have, for the sake of simplicity, 

 considered bodies only, and omitted minds. But what we have said, is ap- 

 plicable, mutatis mutandis, to the latter. The attributes of minds, as well 

 as those of bodies, are grounded on states of feeling or consciousness. But 

 in the case of a mind, we have to consider its own states, as well as those 

 which it produces in other minds. Every attribute of a mind consists either 

 in being itself affected in a certain way, or affecting other minds in a certain 

 way. Considered in itself, we can predicate nothing of it but the series 

 of its own feelings. When we say of any mind, that it is devout, or super- 

 stitious, or meditative, or cheerful, we mean that the ideas, emotions, or 

 volitions implied in those words, form a frequently recurring part of the 

 series of feelings, or states of consciousness, which fill up the sentient ex- 

 istence of that mind. 



In addition, however, to those attributes of a mind which are grounded 

 on its own states of feeling, attributes may also be ascribed to it, in the 

 same manner as to a body, grounded on the feelings which it excites in 

 other minds. A mind does not, indeed, like a body, excite sensations, but 

 it may excite thoughts or emotions. The most important example of attri- 

 butes ascribed on this ground, is tfie employment of terms expressive of 

 approbation or blame. When, for Example, we say of any character, or (in 

 other words) of any mind, that it is admirable, we mean that the contem- 

 plation of it excites the sentiment of admiration ; and indeed somewhat 

 more, for the woi'd implies that we not only feel admiration, but approve 

 that sentinaent in ourselves. In some cases, under the semblance of a sin- 

 gle attribute, two are I'eally predicated : one of them, a state of the mind 

 itself ; the other, a state with which other minds are affected by thinking 

 of it. As when we say of any one that he is generous. The Avord gene- 

 rosity expresses a certain state of mind, but being a term of praise, it also 

 expresses that this state of mind excites in us another mental state, called 

 approbation. The assertion made, therefore, is twofold, and of the follow- 

 ing purport: Certain feelings form habitually a part of this person's sen- 

 tient existence; and the idea of those feelings of his, excites the sentiment 

 of approbation in ourselves or others. 



As we thus ascribe attributes to minds on the ground of ideas and emo- 

 tions, so may we to bodies on similar grounds, and not solely on the ground 

 of sensations : as in speaking of the beauty of a statue ; since this attribute 

 is grounded on the peculiar feeling of pleasure which the statue produces 

 in our minds ; Avhich is not a sensation, but an emotion. 



VII. Ge^teral Results. 



§ 15. Our survey of the varieties of Things which have been, or which 

 are capable of being, named — which have been, or are capable of being, 

 either predicated of other Things, or themselves made the subject of predi- 

 cations — is now concluded. 



Our enumeration commenced with Feelings. These we scrupulously dis- 

 tinguished from the objects which excite them, and from the organs by 

 which they are, or may be supposed to be, conveyed. Feelings are of four 

 sorts: Sensations, Thoughts, Emotions, and Volitions. What are called 

 Perceptions are merely a particular case of Belief, and Belief is a kind of 

 thought. Actions are merely volitions followed by an effect. 



