THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 65 



After Feelings we proceeded to Substances. These are either Bodies or 

 Minds. Without entering into the grounds of the metaphysical doubts 

 which have been raised concerning the existence of Matter and Mind as ob- 

 jective realities, we stated as sufficient for us the conclusion in which the 

 best tliinkers are now for the most part agreed, that all we can know of 

 Matter is the sensations which it gives us, and the order of occurrence of 

 those sensations ; and that while the substance Body is the unknown cause 

 of our sensations, the substance Mind is the unknown recipient. 



The only remaining class of Namable Things is Attributes; and these 

 are of three kinds, Quality, Relation, and Quantity. Qualities, like sub- 

 stances, are known to us no otherwise than by the sensations or other 

 states of consciousness which they excite : and while, in compliance with 

 3ommon usage, we have continued to speak of them as a distinct class of 

 Things, we showed that in predicating them no one means to predicate any 

 :hing but those sensations or states of consciousness, on which they may be 

 >aid to be grounded, and by which alone they can be defined or described. 

 Relations, except the simple cases of likeness and unlikeness, succession 

 ind simultaneity, are similarly grounded on some fact or phenomenon, that 

 s, on some series of sensations or states of consciousness, more or less 

 complicated. The third species of Attribute, Quantity, is also manifestly 

 :, 'rounded on something in our sensations or states of feeling, since there is 

 ;in indubitable difference in the sensations excited by a larger and a smaller 

 l)ulk, or by a greater or a less degree of intensity, in any object of sense or 

 cf consciousness. All attributes, therefore, are to us nothing but either 

 (ur sensations and other states of feeling, or something inextricably in- 

 A olved therein ; and to this even the peculiar and simple relations just ad- 

 A erted to are not exceptions. Those peculiar relations, however, are so im- 

 I ortant, and, even if they might in strictness be classed among states of 

 c onsciousness, are so fundamentally distinct from any other of those states, 

 t lat it would be a vain subtlety to bring them under that common descrip- 

 t on, and it is necessary that they should be classed apart.* 



As the result, therefore, of our analysis, we obtain the following as an 

 e luraeration and classification of all Namable Things : 



1st. Feelings, or States of Consciousness. 



2d. The Minds which experience those feelings. 



3d. The Bodies, or external objects which excite certain of those feelings, 

 t igether with the powers or properties whereby they excite them ; these 

 h tter (at least) being included rather in compliance with common opinion, 

 a id because their existence is taken for granted in the common language 

 f] om which I can not prudently deviate, than because the recognition of 

 SI ch powers or properties as real existences appears to be warranted by a 

 S( und philosophy. 



4th, and last. The Successions and Co-existences, the Likenesses and Un- 

 li :enesses, between feelings or states of consciousness. Those relations, 

 w len considered as subsisting between other things, exist in reality only 

 b( tween the states of consciousness which those things, if bodies, excite, if 

 m nds, either excite or experience. 



' Professor Bain {Logic, i., 49) defines attributes as "points of community among classes." 

 Tl IS definition expresses well one point of view, but is liable to the objection that it applies 

 oil )' to the attributes of classes ; though an object, unique in its kind, may be said to have at- 

 tri utes. Moreover, the definition is not ultimate, since the points of community themselves 

 ad lit of, and require, further analysis ; and Mr. Bain does analyze them into resemblances in 

 tht sensations, or other states of consciousness excited by the object. 



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