74 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



that propositions (except sometimes Avlien tlie mind itself is the subject 

 treated of) are not assertions resj^ecting our ideas of things, but assertions 

 respecting the things themselves. In onTei^ to believe that gold is yellow, 

 I must, indeed, have the idea of gold, and the idea of yellow, and some- 

 thing having reference to those ideas must take place in my mind ; but 

 my belief has not reference to the ideas, it has reference to the things. 

 What I believe, is a fact relating to the outward thing, gold, and to the 

 impression made by that outward thing upon the human organs; not a 

 fact relating to my conception of gold, which would be a fact in my mental 

 history, not a fact of external nature. It is true, that in order to believe 

 this fact in external nature, another fact must take place in my mind, a 

 process must be performed upon my ideas ; but so it must in every thing 

 else that I do. I can not dig the ground unless I have the idea of the 

 ground, and of a spade, and of all the other things I am operating upon, 

 and unless I put those ideas together.* But it would be a very ridiculous 

 description of digging the ground to say that it is putting one idea into an- 

 other. Digging is an operation which is performed upon the things them- 

 selves, though it can not be performed unless I have in my mind the ideas 

 of them. And in like manner, believing is an act which has for its subject 

 the facts themselves, though a previous mental conception of the facts is 

 an indispensable condition. When I say that fire causes heat, do I mean 

 that my idea of fire causes my idea of heat ? No : I mean that the natural 

 phenomenon, fire, causes the natural phenomenon, heat. When I mean t o 

 assert any thing respecting the ideas, I give them their proper name, I 

 call them ideas : as when I say, that a cTiThrs idea of a battle is unlike the 

 reality, or tliat the ideas entertained of the Deity have a great effect on the 

 characters of mankind. 



The notion that what is of primary importance to the logician in a prop- 

 osition, is the relation between the two ideas corresponding to the subject 

 and predicate (instead of the relation between the two pheno'mena which 

 they respectively express), seems to me one of the most fatal errors ever 

 introduced into the philosophy of Logic ; and the principal cause why the 

 theory of the science has made such inconsiderable progress during the last 

 two centuries. The treatises on Logic, and on the branches of Mental Phi- 

 losophy connected with Logic, which have been produced since the intru- 

 sion of this cardinal error, though sometimes written by men of extraor- 

 dinary abilities and attainments, almost always tacitly imply a theory that 

 the investigation of truth consists in contemplating and handling our ideas, 

 or conceptions of things, instead of tlie things themselves: a doctrine tan- 

 tamount to the assertion, that the only mode of acquiring knowledge of 

 nature is to study it at second hand, as represented in our own minds. 

 Meanwhile, inquiries into every kind of natural phenomena were incessant- 

 ly establishing great and fruitful truths on most important subjects, by 

 processes upon which these views of the nature of Judgment and Reason- 

 ing threw no light, and in which they afforded no assistance whatever. No 

 wonder that those who knew by practical experience how truths are ar- 

 rived at, should deem a science futile, which consisted chiefly of such spec- 



* Dr. Whewell {Philosophy of Discovery, p. 242) questions this statement, and asks, "Are 

 ■vve to say that a mole can not dig the ground, except he has an idea of the ground, and of 

 the snout and paws with which he digs it?" I do not know what passes in a mole's mind, 

 nor what amount of mental apprehension may or may not accompany his instinctive actions. 

 But a human being does not use a spade by instinct ; and he certainly could not use it unless 

 he had knowledge of a spade, and of the earth which he uses it upon. 



